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CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW-JuRISDICTIONAL DISPUTES-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

HAS No JURISDICTION IN A § 10(k) PROCEEDING WHERE Two UNIoNs, WHICH
ARE COMPETING FOR THE RIGHT TO PERFORM A PARTICULAR JOB ASSIGNMENT,
AGREE ON A VOLUNTARY METHOD OF SETTLEMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE EmPLOYER OF THESE DISPUTING UNIONS

DOES NOT AGREE TO THE CHOSEN

METHOD OF SETTLEMENT.-In the fall of

1966, Texas State Tile & Terrazzo

Company assigned certain tile installation work to its employees who were members of the Tile Setters Union. Other employees of Texas State Tile, who were
members of the Plasterers Union, claimed that portions of the work should have
been assigned to members of their union. The Tile Setters rejected the Plasterers'
claim, and the two unions submitted the dispute to the Joint Board for the Settlement of Jurisdictional Disputes (hereinafter referred to as Joint Board) for
determination. The Joint Board awarded the disputed work to the Plasterers.
Upon the Tile Setters' refusal to accept the Joint Board's determination, the
Plasterers picketed the job site, resulting in the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge against the Plasterers.
The National Labor Relations Board held its § 10(k) hearing, and on
August 22, 1967, awarded the disputed work to the Tile Setters.2 The NLRB
rejected the Plasterers' contention that the existence of an agreed-upon method
of settlement (i.e., the Joint Board) deprived it of jurisdiction to make a § 10(k)
determination.
Following the Plasterers' failure to comply with the NLRB decision, an
unfair labor practice hearing was held wherein the Plasterers' contention that the
NLRB had no jurisdiction to make the original § 10(k) determination was again
rejected. The NLRB found the Plasterers in violation of § 8(b) (4) (D), and it
issued a cease and desist order against the Plasterers.3
The Plasterers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia to review and set aside the NLRB order, and the NLRB
cross-petitioned for enforcement of its order. The court of appeals, relying mainly
on its analysis of the legislative history of § 10(k) and NLRB v. Radio and

Television Broadcast Engineers Local 1212 (CBS),

4

held: the National Labor

1 The Joint Board for the Settlement of jurisdictional Disputes should not be confused
with the National Labor Relations Board. The Joint Board is an aspect of the AFL-CIO
Building and Construction Trades Department's "Plan for Settling Jurisdictional Disputes
Nationally and Locally." Brief for Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae
at 5, Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970). The Joint Board is
thus voluntary, non-governmental, dispute settlement machinery. The "Plan" and decisions of
the Joint Board are binding on all International Unions which make up the Building and Construction Trades Department and on the various locals within the international union. Id.
Numerous employer associations and their component members have agreed to be bound by
Joint Board determinations, but the failure of an employer to be bound does not affect the
unions under the plan, and they remain bound regardless of their employer's status. Id. at 12.
The Joint Board is composed of two employee representatives, two employer representatives, and

a fifth neutral member. No union or employer representative may hear any case involving a
union or employer of which he is an officer or representative. Board decisions are based on a
number of factors, including trade practices, past agreements, efficiency, and economy. Id. at
6-7.
2 Plasterers Local 79, 167 N.L.R.B. 185 (1967).
3 Plasterers Local 79, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (1968).
4 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
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Relations Board is without jurisdiction to determine a jurisdictional dispute in a
§ 10(k) proceeding where the two unions, but not the employer, have agreed
upon a voluntary method of adjustment. Plasterers Local 79 u. NLRB, No.
22,073 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970).'
Jurisdictional disputes have historically disrupted the labor scene.6 Such
disputes generally fall into two classes: (1) the work-assignment dispute, wherein
two groups of laborers compete for the right to perform particular job assignments (as in PlasterersLocal 79); and (2) the representation dispute, involving
a conflict over which union shall be the authorized representative of an employee
7
group
In spite of numerous attempts early in the 20th century to establish voluntary
settlement procedures,' the jurisdictional strike problem still plagued employers
at the end of World War II,. The loosening of government-imposed wartime
regulations further aggravated the problem.9 President Truman, in his State of
the Union Address, voiced his concern:
Another form of interunion disagreement is the jurisdictional strike
involving the question of which labor union is entitled to perform a particular
task. When rival unions are unable to settle such disputes themselves, provisions must be made for peaceful and binding determination of the issues.' 0
On June 23, 1947, Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act
over the President's veto." The text of § 10(k) of the Act, 2 which must be read
in conjunction with § 8(b) (4) (D)," provides that:
5 Judge MacKinnon filed a dissenting opinion based upon the Board's past interpretation
of "parties" in cases of this nature, his own interpretation of the legislative history (or lack
thereof), and the language of the section itself. He contended that the long-standing interpretation of § 10(k) by the NLRB (see, e.g., Local 65, Operative Plasterers (Twin City Tile
& Marble Co.), 152 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1965); Local 450, Int'l Operating Eng'rs (Sline Indus.
Painters), 119 N.L.R.B. 1725 (1958); Local 231, Int'l Hod Carriers (Middle States Tel. Co.),
91 N.L.R.B. 598 (1950), requiring the employer to be a party to any voluntary agreement,
should not be overturned. Because of the employer's economic interest in any job assignment,
Judge MacKinnon felt that he should have a voice in any voluntary settlement, and should not
be required to accept settlements reached by the competing unions without his participation
and consent.
6 The earliest such recorded dispute is probably that of the Cobblers and Cordwainers
over the right to certain shoe work in the year 1395. Mann & Husband, Private and Governmental Plans for the Adjustment of Interunion Disputes: Work Assignment Conflict to 1949,
13 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
7 Farmers & Powers, The Role of the National Labor Relations Board in Resolving
JurisdictionalDisputes, 46 VA. L. REV. 660, 664 (1960); Gaba, JurisdictionalDisputes in the
Building Trades, 37 TExAs L. REV. 859 (1959).
8 The first of these voluntary procedures was established by the American Federation of
Labor with the formation of the National Building Trades Council in 1897. Numerous other
attempts were made in the interim until the passing of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. K.
STRAND, JUISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN CONSTRUCTION:

THE CAUSES, THE JOINT BOARD, AND

THE NLRB 61-71 (1961). For an excellent analysis of the various governmental and private
attempts to establish settlement machinery, see Mann & Husband, supra note 6.
9 Mann & Husband, supra note 6, at 40.
10 93 CONG. REc. 136 (1947).
11 Id. at 7538.
12 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1964).
13 Section 8(b) provides, in part, that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual to engage in, a
strike . . . where . . . an object thereof is:
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(k) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair
labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158(b)
of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the
dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless,
within 10 days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to
such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute.
Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the
Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall
be dismissed.
A thorough understanding of the significance of § 10(k) requires an understanding of its procedural import. The section provides an intermediate step
between the filing of an unfair labor practice charge and the issuance of the
complaint. The union charged with a violation can avoid the complaint, and a
possible adverse decision at the complaint hearing, by voluntarily settling the
dispute or accepting the NLRB's § 10(k) determination. The section thereby
favors voluntary settlement, rather than compulsion under a cease and desist
order " In addition, the purpose of the § 10(k) hearing is to determine the
dispute out of which the alleged unfair labor practice arose, rather than to
determine the unfair labor practice charge on the merits.
S. 1126,'" as reported from the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
was the forerunner of the present § 10(k). This bill was almost identical to the
section as finally enacted. There was, however, one'exception. In the original
Senate version the NLRB was empowered to appoint an arbitrator to settle the
dispute. This arbitration provision was deleted without explanation by the House
Conference Committee. The' remainder of the section, however, remained unchanged." In referring to § 10(k), the House Conference Committee stated that
§ 10(k) "would empower and direct the Board to hear and determine disputes
between unions giving rise to unfair labor practices under section 8(b) (4) (D)

[Jurisdictional strikes]."'" (Emphasis added.)
The majority of the court in PlasterersLocal 79 placed much emphasis on
this report as one "of highest standing in ascertaining legislative intent."'" However, such reliance could possibly be misplaced as.the next sentence of the report
implies that the Committee was referring to a representation dispute rather than
a work-assignment conflict. 9

(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in
a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to
employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless
such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work: ....29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (1964).14 See Local 595, AFL (Bechtel Corp.), 112 N.L.R.B. 812 (1955).
15 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947).
16 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947).
I - "
17 Id.
18 Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, No. 22,073 at 19 (D. C. Cir. June 30, 1970).
19 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1947). That sentence reads
as follows: "If the employees select as their bargaining agent the organization that the Board
determines has jurisdiction, and if the Board certifies that union, the employer will, of course,
be under the statutory duty to bargain with it."
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Nevertheless, the underlying intent of the Act, as interpreted by the majority,
is reinforced by reference in the House Report to sympathy strikes, illegal boycotts,
and jurisdictional strikes as all having
in common the characteristic that they do not arise out of any dispute
between an employer and employees who engage in the activities, or, in
most cases, between the employer and any of his employees. More often than
not the employers are powerless to comply with demands giving rise to the
as well are the helpless
activities, and many times they and their employees
20
victims of quarrels that do not concern them at all.
It thus appears that the employer was viewed as a neutral party who was not
involved in the dispute.
Similarly, the Conference Committee reported: "Jurisdictional strikes
usually involve quarrels, not between employers and employees, but between rival
unions, which use the strike weapon against each other ....,21
The language of the Senate Minority Report,2 2 although referring to the
original § 10(k) which included the arbitration clause, further supports the
holding that "parties" refers to the opposing unions and that the employer is not
a party to the jurisdictional dispute underlying the unfair labor practice:
We believe this provision of the bill to be sound, and are pleased to
note that full opportunity is given the parties to reach a voluntary accommodation without government intervention if they so desire. We are confident that the mere threat of governmental action will have a beneficial
effect in stimulating labor organizationsto set up appropriatemachinery for
the settlement of such controversies within their own ranks, where they
properly should be settled!3 (Emphasis added.)
In 1949, due to the discontent surrounding the Labor-Management Relations Act, a bill repealing the Act was introduced which contained similar provisions for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes. It empowered the NLRB to
appoint an arbitrator capable of binding both the employer and employees.2
The language of the bill was considerably more specific than § 10(k): "[T]he
Board may... appoint an arbitrator to hear and determine the dispute..., first
affording the labor organizationsinvolved in the dispute a reasonable opportunity
to settle their controversy between or among themselves."25 (Emphasis added.)
It is therefore evident that, at least in 1949, Congress viewed the jurisdictional
dispute-the problem to be cured by § 10(k)'s successor-as one between the
unions themselves. It did not include the employer.
In addition, most scholars who have analyzed § 10(k) and its history have
also concluded that Congress did not intend that the employer be considered a

20
21
22
23
24
25

H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947).
Id. at 24.
S. REP. No. 105, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
Id. at 18-19.
S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(d) (1949).
Id.
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necessary party to any voluntary agreement." Some commentators, however,
have reached a contrary conclusion.Ir
The NLRB's decisions involving § 10(k) are less than consistent. Differing
fact patterns have produced varying interpretations of the statutory language
which often cannot be reconciled. One author concludes:
After more than twenty years the law in regard to Sections 8(b) (4) (D)
and 10(k) remains in a state of uncertain application ....
Perhaps no other
sections of the Act have engendered so much confusion in the thinking of
lawyers, Board Members, and courts.
...
While it is almost impossible for an attorney to really determine
what the Board will do in any given case, it is possible to utilize some of
the decided cases 2to
justify any rational argument which an attorney may
8
desire to advance.

With such encouragement, an analysis of the NLRB's holdings will be commenced. The Board's first interpretation of § 10(k) came in 1949 in the case
of Lodge 68, I.A.M. (Moore Drydock Co.). 21 In Moore Dry Dock the dispute
involved a preferential hiring agreement and picketing by members of the International Association of Machinists not employed by Moore. The NLRB, relying
on its interpretation of the legislative history, concluded that a § 10(k) determination of the dispute was proper even though the employer was not neutral and refused to assign the disputed task to the I.A.M. Similarly, the fact that the NLRB
lacked the power to directly enforce its determination against the employer did
not preclude the determination. Moore Dry Dock was also the genesis of the
NLRB's policy of refusing to make an independent affirmative award of the
disputed work to either union-a policy later overruled by the Supreme Court."
A NLRB member, Houston, filed a strong dissent, arguing that the § 10(k)
determination was not within the Board's jurisdiction if the employer was not
truly neutral and disinterested. 1
In Local 16, CIO (Juneau Spruce Corp.), 2 the NLRB reaffirmed its
Moore Dry Dock holding even though the group to whom the non-neutral
Juneau Spruce Corporation had assigned the work made no claim to it. In
26 E.g., ABA, REPORT
INDUSTRY,

OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TnE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW 456-57 (1965) ("The literal language of

Section 10(k) does not require the employer to be a party to any agreed upon method of
settlement ....
Nowhere in the legislative history is there any indication that Congress sought
to require employer participation in this agreed upon method of adjustment of the dispute....
[Tihe legislative history makes no mention of employer participation in private settlements.");
O'Donoghue, jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52 GEO. L.J.
315, 333 (1964) ("It is reasonable to assume, then, that Congress did not intend employers to
be parties to a settlement of a dispute that did not concern them."); Sussman, Section 10(k):
Mandate for Change? 47 B.U. L. REv. 201, 229 (1967) ("The NLRB is incorrect in presently
requiring that the employer be a party to an agreement procedure before it satisfies the
standards necessary to avoid a section 10(k) hearing. Thus, if two unions by membership in
the Building Trades Department are bound to accept the decisions of the Joint Board, this
should be sufficient to dispense with the section 10(k) hearing").
27 Farmers & Powers, supra note 7, at 672-73.
28 3 J. JENmS, LABOR LAW § 18.3 at 524; 526 (1969).

29
30
31
32

81 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1949).
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212 (CBS), 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
81 N.L.R.B. at 1128.
82 N.L.R.B. 650 (1949).
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referring to the ten-day grace period for voluntary adjustment before a § 10(k)
hearing, the Board stated: "[T]he opportunity is afforded the rival unions to
reach a settlement or to agree upon methods for reaching an adjustment of the
dispute.... ."" (Emphasis added.)
Both the National Labor Relations Board 4 and Plasterers Local 7935 cite the
Juneau Spruce case in support of their contradictory views regarding the parties
necessary for the voluntary settlement of the underlying dispute. The NLRB
relies on the holding of the case; the Plasterers cite the above-quoted language.
Although both Moore Dry Dock and Juneau Spruce did involve the issue of
whether or not a § 10(k) determination could properly be rendered when the
employer was not neutral, the context in which the issues arose did not involve
the specific controversy over who is a party to the underlying dispute. At most,
these cases support the hypothesis that the employer's lack of neutrality cannot
deprive the NLRB of its § 10(k) jurisdiction where the parties have not arrived
at a voluntary method or settlement of the dispute. A finding that the employer is
thereby rendered a party to the underlying dispute, and a necessary party to any
voluntary settlement, does not necessarily flow from the Juneau Spruce holding as
the NLRB contends.
Local 231, InternationalHod Carriers (Middle States Telephone Co.), s6
was the first case in which the NLRB faced squarely the questions of whether the
employer was a necessary party to a voluntary agreement, and whether an agreement to which only the disputing unions were parties would deprive it of § 10(k)
jurisdiction. The fact pattern was analogous to that in PlasterersLocal 79. The
disputing unions were both bound by the voluntary settlement machinery (the
Joint Board), but the employer was not and refused to accept the Joint Board's
determination. The NLRB cursorily held that the employer must be a party to
a voluntary settlement agreement before the agreement would be determinative
of the underlying dispute. As precedent for its holding, the NLRB cited3" Los
Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council (Westinghouse Electric
Corp.). 8 Westinghouse held, as did Juneau Spruce, that the NLRB could not
make an affirmative independent award of the disputed work since §§
8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) "do not deprive an employer of the right to assign work
to his own employees, nor were they intended to interfere with an employer's
freedom to hire . . ."" Consequently, it appears that the only basis enunciated
for the NLRB's holding that the employer is a necessary party to any voluntary
settlement is based on a premise which has since been overruled by the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Radio and Television Broadcast Engineers Local 1212
(CBS), 0 where it was held that the NLRB must make an independent affirmative
award. The NLRB's long-standing policy of requiring the employer to be a
".

33 Id. at 655-56.
34 Brief for Respondent at 15, Plasterers Local 79 v. N.L.R.B., No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir.
June 30, 1970).
35 Brief for Petitioner at 25, Plasterers Local 79 v. N.L.R.B., No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir, June
30, 1970).
36 91 N.L.R.B. 598 (1950).
37 Id. at 604.
38 83 N.L.R.B. 477 (1949).
39 Id. at 481. The Westinghous.e decision, in turn, cited Juneau Spruce.
40 364 U.S. 573 (1961).
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party to any voluntary settlement before it wiU defer its own .§ 10(k) determination41 is merely a carryover of this repudiated view'that the employer's assignment
is the most important factor, and a prerogative of which he cannot be deprived; 2
, The NLRB's next interpretation of § 10(k) came in Wood,, Wire, & Metal
Lathers International,Local 9 (A. W: Lee Inc.)."' In Lee, all parties, including
the employer, were contractually bound by the Joint Board settlement machinery.
One of the unions, however, refused to accept the Joint Board's determination,
daiming that the Joint Board settlement could not deprive the NLRB of its
power to determine the dispute through the § 10(k) hearing procedure. The
Board held that an agreed upon method did exist and it was therefore without
jurisdiction to determine the dispute in a § 10(k) proceeding. In so holding, it
relied on an earlier decision ruling that an employer, once contractually bound to
the Joint Board procedure, could not disav ow that obligation and seek a NLRB
determination of the controversy.4 The rationale for the Lee decision was succinctly expressed:
To hold otherwise would condone and sanction Lathers Local 9's breach
of the agreement, and would tend to discourage and render worthless the
making of such agreements, contrary to the statutory purpose to encourage
the voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes. Otherwise, any party
adversely affected by a determination made pursuant to the agreement
could breach the agreement with impunity and then have recourse to this
Board for a redetermination of the dispute in the hope that the redetermination might be favorable. 45 (Footnote omitted.)
A parallel case before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, NLRB v. Local
825, InternationalOperatingEngineers," received a similar disposition: "[H]aving agreed to the settlement... by the Joint Board and... experiencing an
adverse ruling, Local 825 is in no position to challenge the merits of that ruling
before another tribunal."4
If one attempts to reconcile these decisions with the contention that the
employer is a necessary party to any voluntary agreement, he is met with an
irreconcilable dichotomy: Although it is accepted that § 10(k) was meant to
further voluntary methods as far as practicable, 48 the NLRB.'s interpretation of
"parties to the dispute" would encourage all parties to refrain from entering into
voluntary agreement procedures other than on an ad hoc basis. The employer,
by not stipulating beforehand that he would accept a Joint Board determination,
could accept their decision, ad hoc, in which case the particular dispute would be
settled voluntarily and the notice of the § 10(k) hearing necessarily quashed.
41 See, e.g., Local 65, Operative Plasterers (Twin City Tile & Marble Co.), 152 N.L.R.B.
1609 (1965); Local 450, Int'l Operating Eng'rs (Sline Indus. Painters), 119 N.L.R.B. 1725
(1958); Local 231, Int'l Hod Carriers (Middle States Tel. Co.), 91 N.L.R.B. 598 (1950).
42 This rationale is more fully developed in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 31-32.
43 113 N.L.R.B. 947-(1955).
44 Teamsters Local 236 (Win. F. Traylor), 97 N.L.R.B. 1003 (1952).
45 113 N.L.R.B. at 953-54....

46 410 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969).
47 Id. at 9.

48 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212 (CBS), 364 U.S.
573, 576-77 (1961); Wood, Wire, & Metal Lathers Int'l, Local 9 (A.W. Lee Inc.), 113
N.L.R.B. 947 (1955).
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However, if he were not satisfied with the Joint Board's determination and not
contractually bound to accept it, he could get a second and possibly more favorable determination through the § 10(k) procedure. It would thus be most advantageous for the employer to refrain from any binding agreements concerning
the voluntary settlement of future disputes.
Similarly, the unions could also agree to be bound by the Joint Board.
However, if the employer was not bound and was favorably disposed to either of
their claims, that union could obtain a second determination from the NLRB and
disregard its contractual obligation to accept a Joint Board settlement.
The CBS case,49 wherein the Court struck down the NLRB's long standing
non-affirmative award policy, was relied upon extensively by the PlasterersLocal
79 majority. The prelude to CBS involved a dispute between stage employees
and television technicians over who had the right to perform certain lighting
functions. This dispute culminated in a work stoppage and the issuance of a
cease and desist order by the NLRB. The NLRB refused, however, to make an
affirmative award of the disputed work to either labor group. Instead, it issued
the cease and desist order on the basis of its finding that the striking employees
had no "right" to the work in question.5" The Supreme Court in its analysis of

§§ 8(b) (4) (D) and 10(k) concluded that:
Ihe clause "the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have
arisen" can have no other meaning except a jurisdictional dispute under §
8(b) (4) (D) which is a dispute between two or more groups of employees
over which is entitled to do certain work for an employer.51 (Emphasis
added.)

Accordingly, § 10(k) offers strong inducements to quarreling unions to
settle their differences by directing dismissal of unfair5 2labor practice charges
upon voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes.
The Court, after analyzing § 10(k) and its legislative history, concluded that
Congress visualized the employer as a neutral bystander, caught between the
competing unions and not being able to satisfy either by any single work assignment. It noted that the employer is trapped between "the devil and the deep
blue." 3
In the CBS case, however, the employer was truly neutral and cared not who
performed the disputed work, so long as it was done. He had in the past assigned
it to both of the unions in attempting to satisfy them, but was unable to avoid the
conflict regardless of which party received the assignment. This employer disinterest apparently had much bearing on the Court's decision and the case is
thus distinguishable from PlasterersLocal 79 where the employer was not neutral.
Even more important, the CBS Court never addressed itself to the questions of
49
50
51
52
53

364 U.S. 573 (1961).
Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212 (CBS), 121 N.L.R.B. 1207 (1958).
364 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 575.
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who the parties to the dispute were, and whether or not the employer was a
necessary party to any voluntary agreement.
Soon after the CBS decision was handed down, however, the District Court
for the District of Delaware squarely faced the task of interpreting the meaning
of "parties" as used in § 10(k). In Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal Workers,"
the court held that a dispute over work assignments, where the union to which
the employer assigned the work made no claim to it (and in fact, affirmed the
opposing union's right to it), was not a dispute between two unions which would
empower the NLRB to make a § 10(k) determination. It was, rather, a dispute
between the employer and one employee group, which § 10(k) did not encompass. In his analysis of §§ 10(k) and 8(b) (4) (D) and their interrelationship, Judge Wright commented:
[C]ongress continually referred to it as a ban on jurisdictional disputes in
which rival groups of employees use economic coercion against each other
with the employer trapped in the middle.

[A] fair reading of § 10(k) would seem to indicate that the "dispute" to be
"determined" is one between rival groups of employees over which is entitled
to "particular work."55 (Emphasis added.)
After extensively analyzing the CBS opinion and its mandate regarding the
furthering of voluntary methods of adjustment, the judge addressed the NLRB's
contention concerning the parties necessary to a voluntary settlement procedure:
[Petitioner's theory] apparently is that no agreement between the groups of
employees involved can stay the operation of § 8 (b) (4) (D) so long as the
employer does not agree. But this argument proves too much .... Otherwise, the Board would, under § 10(k), be forced to decide on their merits
disputes solely between unions and employers.5 6 (Footnotes omitted.)
In a rather caustic comment concerning past NLRB policies in the area of
voluntary adjustment, Judge Wright admonished:
Petitioner's theories have demonstrated an unwillingness to depart from
prior Board law even where necessary to comply with Radio and Television
Engineers. The Board has held in the past that the employer must be a
party to the "voluntary adjustment."57 (Citation omitted.)
A study of the excellent analysis presented in the Penello opinion clearly
convinces one that the NLRB's contentions cannot 'be reconciled either with the
legislative history of § 10(k) or any rational policy goals, and that the court in
Plasterers Local 79 could have justified no other decision than that which it
54 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961).

55 Id. at 463-64.
56 Id. at 466.
57 Id. at n.51.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

reached."

[Summer, 1971]

The Penello view is not without contradiction, however-at least in

cases decided prior to CBS.5"
Concerning the issue of who § 10(k) requires as "parties" before a determinable dispute exists, the NLRB has wholeheartedly accepted the Penello rationale. This is evidenced by its decision in Teamsters Local 107 (Safeway Stores).8 0
In Safeway, upon rehearing granted to reconsider the case in light of the CBS
decision, the NLRB found that the employer-employee dispute remaining, where
the opposing unions had agreed upon a settlement, was not a dispute which could
be determined under the power granted by § 10(k). The Board relied on Judge
Wright's "painstaking analysis" of the section in Penello.
The Board has consistently adhered to the holdings of Penello and Safeway."' In Carpet, Linoleum, & Soft Tile Layers, Local 1905 (Southwest Floor
Co.), 2 the NLRB refused to exercise § 10(k) jurisdiction and gave full credit
to the Joint Board's determination, even though the employer was not bound by it
and refused to accept it as conclusive. The NLRB reasoned that no dispute
existed within the language of § 10(k) since the unions had agreed upon a
method for settlement, and the only remaining dispute was between the nonneutral employer and one of the unions.
The view taken by the NLRB in the above cases is, sub silentio, in direct
conflict with that advocated by it and supported by the dissent in PlasterersLocal
79. The NLRB is following a bifurcated interpretation of the-term "parties" for
the purposes of § 10(k)."6 That section, which provides that "the Board is
empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless ... the parties to such dispute...
have adjusted or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of the
dispute" is undergoing two distinct and conflicting interpretations regarding whom
the term "parties" refers to: in determining whether or not a § 10(k) dispute
exists, an interpretation of "parties" as not including the employer is followed in
accordance with the Safeway decision. On the other hand, in interpreting who
was meant to be a party for the purposes of settling this same dispute, the NLRB
has consistently held that the employer must be one of the "parties."" The
NLRB's contention thus appears to be that, on the one hand, the employer is a
necessary party to any voluntary agreement in settlement of the underlying
dispute. On the other hand, he is not a party for the purpose of bringing a dispute
between himself and an employee group within the coverage of § 10(k)
since that section deals only with disputes between employee groups.
Although both the Safeway and Lee rationales independently provide support for the PlasterersLocal 79 decision, when viewed conjunctively they mandate
58 The Penello opinion, although done an injustice by this author's limited citation and
quotation, should be read in its entirety if for no other reason than to introduce the reader to a
seldom found degree of excellence and clarity in legal expression and analysis.
59 See Local 450, Int'l Operating Eng'rs v. Elliott, 256 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1958);
McGuinn, JurisdictionalDisputes & the N.L.R.B., 15 N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 103 (1962).
60 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961).
61 See, e.g., Seafarers Int'l Union (Delta Steamship Lines), 172 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1968);
Sheet Metal Workers, Local 272 (Valley Sheet Metal Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1962).
62 143 N.L.R.B. 251 (1963).
63 This conclusion is also advanced in Brief for Petitioner, supra note 35, at 28.
64 See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Local 300 (D'Annunzio Bros. Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B. 836 (1965);
Int'l Operating Eng'rs, Local 66 (Badolato & Son), 135 N.L.R.B. 1392 (1962).
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the decision. In Lee, the NLRB held that once unions voluntarily agree upon
a'method for the settlement of disputes, to allow them to repudiate it would be
to encourage a breach of contract and to discourage voluntary procedures. Accepting this, one reaches the conclusion that in PlasterersLocal,79, where both unions
were contractually bound by the Joint Board, neither could repudiate that
agreement, regardless of its discontent with any particular Joint Board determination. Consequently, if both unions are bound to accept the Joint Board determination, no dispute exists between the unions, but only between the employer and the
union to whom he refuses to award the disputed work. Therefore, under both
the Safeway and CBS interpretation of "dispute," none exists for the purposes of
§ 10(k). Accordingly, the NLRB must quash the notice of hearing since it lacks
jurisdiction to determine a dispute solely between the employer and an employee
group.
Aside from the factors previously discussed, there are two remaining areas
which cannot be neglected if one is to evaluate the practicality of the mandate in
PlasterersLocal 79. These areas are'the enforceability of voluntary methods of
settlement and the speed with which the dispute'is settled through voluntary procedures, as contrasted with the § 10(k) hearing process.
If the NLRB is required to defer its determination in favor of the voluntary
settlement, what means exist to enforce that voluntary agreement and settlement
of the dispute against a party dissatisfied with it? First, where the Joint Board is
the settlement machinery, the unions are contractually bound to accept the
decisions of that board, and they are prohibited from creating any work stoppage.
The work assignment, as given by the employer, must be accepted until the Joint
Board settlement is reached.65 Second, in addition to Joint Board sanctions for
non-compliance:
The impetus for unions to live up to interunion agreements rests on reinforcing considerations of honor, reciprocity, mutuality-and enforceability.
The winning union may bring an action, either in federal 'court under § 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act or in a state court, to secure injunctive relief against
a union that has failed to abide by its agreement to honor the Joint Board
decision and renounce the work.66 (Footnote omitted:)
Third, in the case where a union refuses to abide by its voluntary agreement (the
Joint Board determination) and pickets or engages in other coercive activities,
unfair labor practice charges may be brought and a § 10(b) complaint may be
filed against the non-complying union. Although the availability of such a
procedure in the absence of a § 10(k) NLRB determination has been challenged,
the NLRB finalized its validity in Wood & Metal Lathers International,Local 2
(Acoustical Contractors). In that case the Board held that when notice of a.
voluntary settlement is received, the notice of the § 10(k) hearing will be quashed
and the unfair labor practice charge which precipitated that notice dismissed.
65 The general requirements for participating unions are discussed in Brief for Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 9, Plasterers Local 79 y. N.L.R.B., No.
22,073 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970).
66 Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, No. 22,073 at 23-24 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970).
67 119 N.L.R.B. 1345 (1958).
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If, however, notice is received of a voluntarily agreed-upon method for settlement, the notice will be quashed, but the unfair labor practice charge will remain
pending until notice of an actual settlement of the controversy is received. If the
voluntary means fail to permanently settle the dispute, the absence of the § 10 (k)
determination does not preclude the issuance of a NLRB cease and desist order."8
NLRB practices in the enforcement area thus favor the establishment and acceptance of voluntary methods by providing enforcement sanctions for such settlements in addition to § 10(k)'s built-in favoritism toward voluntary compromises.
Enforcement against the employer is of little import since no method exists
under the Act for directly enforcing any § 10(k) determination against an
employer. The majority of the court in PlasterersLocal 79 capitalizes on this
congressional failure to provide a means of binding the employer as further
evidence that the employer was not intended to be a party to the dispute or to
any voluntary settlement. 6 Although a plausible argument, the basic premise
involved overlooks the fact that the employer is offered strong encouragement by
§ 8(b) (4) (D) to abide by the NLRB decision. Under this section, it is an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization to engage in conduct: "forcing... any
employer to assign particular work... unless such employer is failing to conform
to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative
for employees performing such work." The employer is thereby refused the right
to bring an unfair labor practice charge against the union if the purpose of the
latter's coercive activity is to force employer compliance to a NLRB order. In
this sense the employer is negatively bound since the union would have a valid
defense to any unfair labor practice charge he might bring against it. A strict
interpretation of § 8(b) (4) (D), however, would not provide this statutory encouragement for employer acceptance of a voluntary agreement. Therefore, the
NLRB's contention that the employer is more likely to accept voluntary agreements if he is a party to them would be buttressed if such a strict interpretation
were given the section. But, considering the underlying encouragement provided
the parties to voluntarily settle their disputes by § 10(k),"' it would seem anomalous to allow the maintenance of an unfair labor practice charge based on the
union's acceptance of a voluntary method, while dismissing such charge if the
activity was in acceptance of a NLRB order.
The second area to be analyzed involves the relative speed at which disputes
are settled. Here, the voluntary procedure of the Joint Board is clearly superior to
the submission of the dispute to the NLRB for determination. The Joint Board
determination is usually granted at the weekly meeting following the submission
of a dispute. In cases requiring extensive investigation, a maximum delay of two
or three weeks may be encountered. 1
In contrast, the NLRB procedure is slow and cumbersome with the median
time between the filing of the charge and the § 10(k) determination being 172.5
68
69
70
(1961).
71

Id. See also NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Operating Eng'rs, 410 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1969).
Plasterers Local 79 v. N.L.R.B., No. 22,073 at 12 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970).
NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs Local 1212 (CBS), 364 U.S. 573

K. STRAND, JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
BOARD, AND THE NLRB 103 (1961).
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days for fiscal year 19682 The Joint Board procedure is thus far superior as a
means of prompt dispute settlement (presupposing equal effectiveness of the Joint
Board and NLRB in permanently ending the dispute).
Although the PlasterersLocal 79 opinion asserts that the employer is not a
necessary party to the voluntary agreement and that he was viewed as neutral by
Congress, the decision through its caveat implies that the employer does have a
valid stake in the dispute and is, to a limited extent, a necessary party to the voluntary agreement. In limiting the impact of the decision to the facts before it, the
court cautions:
Thus, we need not consider the efficacy for purposes of § 10(k) of an interunion proceeding that made no realistic provision for meaningful attention
to the interest of the employer and to questions of efficiency. In the case
before us we have a Joint Board .73. .that takes into account factors of
economy and efficiency of operation.
The court thereby accedes to the contention that the employer is a party with an
interest in the settlement of the dispute. Thus, in some instances, he may be a
necessary party to the voluntary agreement although not, statutorily, a party to
the underlying dispute.
What the court actually held was that on the facts before it, the employer
did not have to be bound by the voluntary agreement in order to deprive the
NLRB of § 10(k) jurisdiction. In other situations, however, he may be a necessary party to such an agreement. The court thereby interjects a modicum of
practicality and a realization of the true problem into its interpretation of §
10(k). But, by so doing, the court left a major question unanswered: when will
the voluntarily agreed-upon method satisfy their loosely enunciated standards
of efficiency and economy consideration? To what extent must it include employer representation? Aside from holding that the present Joint Board meets the
requirements, the court leaves the NLRB to formulate its own answers and
criteria for future settlement methods. 4
Likewise, the court, by basing its decision on the existence of a voluntary
settlement method, failed to reach petitioner's contention that the NLRB has not
complied with the mandate given in CBS and is still following its pre-CBS
practice of "rubber-stamping" employer assignments in its § 10(k) determinations."5
72 Brief for Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 15 n.7,
Plasterers Local 79 v. NLR.B, No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1970). Further indicia of
the Joint Board's effectiveness are found in the fact that in the period from July, 1961, to
January, 1969, the Joint Board rendered 3,943 jurisdictional dispute determinations. The
N.L.R.B. rendered 290. Id. at 13-14. For a most critical view of the N.L.R.B.'s effectiveness,
see O'Donoghue, JurisdictionalDisputes in the Construction Industry Since CBS, 52 GEo. L.J.
315, 333 (1964).
73 Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, No. 22,073 at 27 n.27 (D.C. Cir. .Tune 30, 1970).
74 The CBS decision likewise left the criteria upon which the N.L.R.B. would make an
affirmative award up to the NLRB. CBS mandated only that such an award was required.
364 U.S. at 583.
75 Petitioners, in their brief, conduct an extensive survey of NLRB determinations since
CBS, finding that in the time between the CBS decision and December, 1968, the NLRB
made 89 affirmative awards. The employer's assignment was overturned in only six of these.
Brief for Petitioner at 30-38, Plasterers Local 79 v. NLRB, No. 22,073 (D.C. Cir. June 30,

1970).
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Although the court in Plasterers Local 79 reached a conclusion consistent
with the meaning of § 10(k) and fair to all parties involved, both the caveat
previously referred to and the limitation of the decision to its own facts may tend
to negate any beneficial effect which it might have had in bringing some consistency to the overall interpretation of the section.
Legislative clarification, long overdue, appears to be the only solution to the
present maze of conflicting interpretations of § 10(k), a section which disregards
the business reality that the employer is necessarily an interested party to any labor
dispute affecting his operations. The NLRB and the courts, in attempting to
follow the statutory command of the section, have been forced to provide strained
interpretations and distinctions -without differences in order to prevent gross unfairness to the concerned parties. Plasterers Local 79 and its limiting caveat
present another example of the near impossibility of complying with the letter
of the law, yet the decision assures equitable results for those concerned.
Paul J. Tomasi

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-FoURTEENTH

AMENDMENT-EQUAL

PROTECTION

CLAUSE-EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY-FLORIDA STATUTE WHICH CON-

DITIONS STATE SCHOOL SUPPORT ON MAXIMUM TEN-MILL TAX LEVY IS A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUsE.-Florida's public schools are

financed primarily through statewide and local taxation. The state appropriates
funds to the counties through its Minimum Foundation Program in accordance
with certain indices of need. The Florida legislature during the Extraordinary
Session of 1968 enacted a statute, commonly known as the Millage Rollback
Act, which provided that any county that imposed more than ten mills ad valorem
property taxes for educational purposes would become ineligible to receive state
minimum foundation funds for its public educational system.' Twenty-four
Florida counties which had been levying taxes at rates in excess of the ten-mill
limit were forced to "roll back" their millage to avoid losing their state aid. As
a result, the amount of educational funds that could be raised through local taxation efforts was substantially reduced2 and became directly related to the amount
of property within a county.'
The plaintiffs, Florida parents and schoolchildren, 4 brought a class action in
which they alleged that the Millage Rollback Act violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment because it set a taxation limitation for educational purposes by reference to a standard related solely to the amount of property
within a county, not to the county's educational needs. The plaintiffs further
contended that the Act promoted no compelling state interest and was arbitrary
and unreasonable because it failed to provide Florida's children with an economically equal educational opportunity.
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.251 (Cum. Supp. 1970-71).
2 The loss exceeded $50,000,000 measured by the reduction in millage from the year
before the Act was passed. Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 946 (M.D. Fla. 1970), prob.
juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1970) (No. 573).
3 At the ten-mill limit, one county could raise $725 per student by its own taxes, while
another county, using the same limit, could raise only $52 per student. Id. at 947.
4 The defendants are members of the State Board of Education and others who regulate
the amount of Minimum Foundation Program funds paid to the counties. Id. at 946 n.3.
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A single-judge district court refused plaintiffs' 'request for a three-judge court
and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the complaint raised a substantial constitutional issue
and remanded with directions to convenea three-judge court." The three-judge
District Court for the Middle District of Florida held: the Millage Rollback Act,
which required that a county levy no more than ten mills ad valorem property
taxes for educational purposes as a condition to participation in the state's Minimum Foundation Program, violated the equal protection clause since it prevented
poorer counties from adequately financing their children's education. Hargrave
v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 -(M.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W.
3199 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1970) (No. 573).
The court of appeals, in remanding the case to the district court, noted that
plaintiffs based their arguments on novel and recently developed ideas of equal
protection.' Although the equal protection clause has long been used to attack
discriminatory statutes in the Negro's quest for equal educational opportunity, it
has only recently been used outside the racial discrimination context to challenge
statutes allowing gross economic inequalities in the financing of public schools.'
As in Hargrave,these inequalities are largely the result of an educational system
financed primarily by local property taxes." Thus, the amount of revenue.that
can be raised for educational purposes often depends directly upon the amount of
property wealth within any given school district,9 and the extent of the inequalities
is most conspicuously reflected by the varying per pupil expenditures from district
to district.10

.

5 Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969). An order constituting a threejudge court was entered by the district court in Hargrave v. McKinney, 302 F. Supp. 1381
(M.D. Fla. 1969).
6 413 F.2d at 324. Two authors who have written on this subject observe that:
It is a familiar yet ever surprising observation of students of constitutional law that
the most fundamental issues are usually the last to be resolved. That observation
holds true for the basic constitutional issue of public education inequality, which has
avoided judicial attention throughout decades of rulings on narrower questions of
school segregation, and education issues in such areas as teacher loyalty and religion
in public schooling. Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 7.
7 See generally Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:-A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. ,Rav.305 (1969); Horowitz &
Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance
Programs from Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.- L. Rmv. 787 (1968); Kurland,
Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional jurisprudence Undefined, 35
U. CH. L. REv. 583 (1968); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 7 (1969); Silard
& White, IntrastateInequalities in Public Education: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. Rnv. 7; Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
8 See, e.g., 1 U.S. Coassex ON CrvIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
25 (1967); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 7, at 312.
9 See, e.g., Michelman. supra note 7, at 48, 50. "The core of the grievance is that states
are forcing local districts to settle for whatever education they can afford out of their own
means." Id. at 50.
10 See, e.g., I U.S. ComM'N ON CiviL, RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
28 (1967). A breakdown of the discrepancies in the Chicago area was recently made in one
law review article:
rTlhe expenditure per high school pupil in a suburb to the north of Chicago is
1,283 dollars; in a suburb to the south of the city it is 723 dollars.- The expenditure
per elementary school pupil in a northern suburb is 919 dollars; in a southern suburb
it is 421 dollars. Levi, The University, the Professions and the Law, 56 CALIF. L.
Rxv. 251, 258 (1968).
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Since the Hargrave decision is based on little direct precedent, it is necessary
to examine judicial treatment of three related areas: discriminatory classifications
generally, educational inequalities containing a racial discrimination element, and
classifications in which wealth or poverty is a factor.
In analyzing economic or business regulations to determine their constitutionality under the equal protection clause, the courts have traditionally applied
the "rational basis" test." Under this test the court determines "whether the
classification utilized was reasonable in light of the statutory purpose." The
classification will not be found arbitrary or unreasonable unless it rests on grounds
wholly unrelated to achievement of legitimate governmental objectives or unless
there is no state of facts reasonably conceivable to justify it. 2 However, where
classifications are based on "suspect" criteria or affect "fundamental" interests,
the courts have required a much stricter standard of review, and the state must
show a "compelling interest" for its distinctions before the classification will be
upheld.' Racial classifications have consistently been subjected to rigid scrutiny
and classifications based on wealth may also be "suspect."' 5 Although the criteria
for determining fundamental rights have not been well defined, apparently procreation, 6 voting, 7 marital privacy," and interstate travel" qualify for this
"inner circle"2 of protection.
While the federal courts have never formally declared that the right to an
education is fundamental, judicial treatment of educational inequalities where
there has been an element of racial discrimination gives some indication of their
attitude toward the equality of educational opportunity concept, the importance
of education, and the possibility of extending the equality of educational opMichelman points out that: "It seems reasonable to assume ... that educational expenditure is a sufficiently important predictor of educational quality to warrant the excitation of
equal protection sensors by any state-sanctioned differences therein." Michelman, supra note 7,
at 50.
11 The rational basis test was best explained in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961):
Although no precise formula has been developed, the Court has held that the
Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws
which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it. Id. at 425-26.
12 Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal-the Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in
Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147, 1155 (1966).
13 See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 806-07 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an excellent discussion of
the development of the "compelling interest" test, see Comment, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 142
(1969).
14 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
15 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16 Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 '(1969); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 142 (1969).
18 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
20 The term is used by Coons, Clune & Sugarman to designate those cases "singled out upon
substantive grounds for special scrutiny." Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 7, at 346.
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portunity standard beyond the racial discrimination realm. In a series of cases21
22
beginning in 1938 and leading up to the historic Brown v. Board of Education,
the Supreme Court, while adhering to the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson," found that where a state failed to provide "substantially equal"
higher-education facilities for Negro students, these students were deprived of the
equal protection of the laws.24
25
In the first of these cases, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
a Negro was
seeking admission to the law school of a white Missouri university. The Court
had little difficulty in finding that the state had not furnished an equal opportunity for legal training to its Negro students since there were no law schools
in Missouri that accepted Negroes.26 In Sweatt u. Painter," the Court went a step
further. Again a Negro student was seeking admission to a white law school, but
on this occasion the state had hastily opened a new Negro law school prior to the
Supreme Court's decision. While noting that the new law school was "apparently
on the road to full accreditation,"2 the Court decided: ". . we cannot find
substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law
students by the State."2 In evaluating the "substantial equality" of the two law
schools, the Court considered both tangible factors, such as faculty, courses, and
library, and intangible factors, such as prestige and tradition."
In the 1954 landmark school desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education,"1 the unanimous Court struck down the separate but equal doctrine, finding
"[S]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 2 In considering public
education "in the light of its full development" and "present place in American
life, '"3 the Court further declared:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms84 (Emphasis added.)
21 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332
U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938).
25 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
26 Id. at 349-50.
27 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
28 Id. at. 633.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 633-34.
31 347 U.S. 483 '(1954).
32 Id. at 495.
33 Id. at 492.
34 Id. at 493.
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Because Brown is a racial discrimination case, this oft-quoted passage may
not provide direct precedent from which to launch fourteenth amendment attacks on any educational inequality; 5 yet it does indicate the Court's attitude
toward the importance of education and the duty of the state to provide it equally
where it provides it at all.
Several post-Brown federal court decisions involving racial discrimination
have indicated, at least in dicta, a willingness to extend the equality of educational
opportunity concept to fion-racial discriminations involving geography or wealth.
A Louisiana statute authorizing school boards to close the public schools upon
vote of the electors was found unconstitutional in Hall v. St. Helena ParishSchool
Board." Although the three-judge district court's decision was based primarily on
grounds of racial discrimination, the court indicated it would have found the
statute unconstitutional even without the racial element, since ".... another effect
of the statute is to discriminate geographically against all students, white and
colored... where the schools are closed under its provisions."3 7 The court further
stated: "Thus, it is clear enough that, absent a reasonable basis for so classifying,
a state cannot close public schools in one area while, at the same time, it maintains
schools elsewhere with public funds."3 " Since the court could find no rational
basis for the school closure in only one parish, it concluded that "... the present
classification is invidious, and therefore unconstitutional, even under the generous
test of the economic discrimination cases." ' 9
The Supreme Court reached a similar result in Griffin v. School Board," a
case which involved a racially motivated school closing in a Virginia county.
As in Hall, the Court found the closure a denial of equal protection. Yet in
granting relief it not only upheld the district court's power to enjoin county
officials from paying tuition grants and giving tax exemptions to private segregated schools,41 but, more significantly, it pointed out that "... . the District Court
may... require the [county] Supervisors... to levy taxes to raisefunds adequate
to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination a public school
system in Prince Edward County like that operated in other counties in
Virginia."" (Emphasis added.)
By sanctioning such drastic and far-reaching relief measures, the Court left
little doubt as to the extent of its powers to assure schoolchildren within an educational unit of their right "to an education equal to that afforded" in other parts
of the state." The question left unanswered by Griffin is whether the Court will
exercise that power to eliminate educational inequalities when the discrimination
involved is non-racial and non-intentional."
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 7, at 355-58, 380-82.
197 F. Supp. 649, (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id.
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Id. at 232-33.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 234.
Horowitz and Neitring point out:
There should not be a distinction of constitutional significance between offering no
opportunity for public education in some places in a state as compared to other
places and offering significantly lower quality educational opportunity in some places
as compared to other places. Horowitz & Neitring, supra note 7, at 811.
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In Hobson v. Hansen," one of the few racial discrimination cases to deal
directly with inequalities in per pupil expenditures, the litigation was notably
brought on behalf 6f both Negro and poor children in the District of Columbia's
public schools. In a lengthy, well-documented opinion, Judge Skelly Wright
cogently described the existing educational inequalities, and then significantly
noted; "The fact that median per pupil expenditure in the predominantly Negro
elementary schools has been a clear $100 below the figure for predominantly
white schools . . . summarizes all the inequalities ... and perhaps significant
others. 4' 8

The judge remarked that no matter how the Supreme Court

decided the de facto racial segregation issue:
[I]t should be clear that if whites and Negroes, or rich and poor, are to be
consigned to separate schools pursuant to whatever policy, the minimum the
Constitution will require and guarantee is that for their,objectively measurable aspects these schools be run on the basis of real equality, at least unless

any inequalities are adequately justified.49 (Emphasis added.)

Judge Wright concluded that it was the responsibility of the courts to insure that
disadvantaged minorities received equal treatment when the "crucial right to a
public education" was at stake. 50
The Supreme Court has indicated disapproval of laws having unequal
effects on the rich and poor in two areas involving neither educational equality
nor racial discrimination problems. In Griffin v. Illinois51 the right of a criminal
defendant to a free transcript on appeal was in issue. The Court acknowledged
that a state was not required to provide appellate courts or appellate review at all,
but pointed out that "1... that is not to say that a state that does grant appellate

review can do so in a way that discriminates against some" convicted defendants
on account of their poverty." 2 The Court further stated:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a nan gets depends on
the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as
adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts. 53
A similar rationale was employed by the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California"'
where it held that a convicted indigent should have the right to counsel on his
first appeal.
45 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir 1969).
46 Id. at 405.
47 It should be noted that Judge Wright, normally a circuit judge for the D.C. Circuit,
was sitting as district judge by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 291(c) (1968).
48 269 F. Supp. at 496.
49 Id. Judge Wright expressed a more lenient view toward inequalities between schools not
involving Negroes or the poor. Id. at 497. However, this 'does not detract from the main thrust
of his opinion since elimination of the race and poverty factors also eliminates to a great extent
existing educational inequalities.
50 Id. at 497.

51 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
52 Id. at 18.
53 Id. at 19.
54

372 U.S. 353 '(1963).
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In a voting rights case, Harperv. VirginiaBoard of Elections,5 the Supreme
Court found Virginia's $1.50 poll tax unconstitutional and re-emphasized its
Griffin-Douglas view on classifications involving wealth: "Lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race. . . are traditionally disfavored." 5
In 1968 one of the first non-racially based attacks directed specifically at the
inequalities of a state's public school finance laws reached the federal courts. In
McInnis v. Shapiro7 high school and elementary students attending school within
four districts of Cook County, Illinois, challenged the constitutionality of state
statutes that permitted wide variations of expenditures per student from district
to district. They alleged that statutes which permitted school revenues to be
distributed on the basis of such arbitrary factors as variations in district property
values or differing tax rates were a violation of the equal protection clause.
Pointing out that per pupil expenditures in various Illinois counties varied from
$480 to $1,000, 5" plaintiffs claimed that the fourteenth amendment required that
school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs.
The three-judge district court, faced with a statutory educational finance
scheme that did not offer even a pretense of equality of educational opportunity
between wealthy and poor districts, acknowledged that ". . . there is little direct
precedent because the contentions now presented are novel."59 However, the
court summarily discredited all that had been said about equality of educational
opportunity and discrimination based on wealth. 0 The McInnis court conceded
that there were wide variations in the amounts of money available for various
Illinois school districts, that the inequalities of the existing arrangement were
obvious, and that because the educational potential of each child should be
cultivated to the utmost, the poorer school districts should have the additional
funds with which to improve their schools."' Yet it failed to find education a
fundamental right, and it declined to apply the compelling state interest test. It
specifically rejected the concept that public school expenditures should be made
on the basis of pupils' educational needs.0 2 Finally, in applying the rational basis
test, it found an extremely dubious justification for the discriminatory classification.
Apparently the court's rational basis to justify the existing inequalities was
that ". . . delegation of authority to school districts appears designed to allow
individual localities to determine their own tax burden according to the importance which they place upon public schools."013 Although this might be a
valid state objective if all districts had equal property values, it hardly seems a
realistic justification since the districts with the lowest per pupil expenditures are

55 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
56 Id. at 668.
57 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Il.
U.S. 322 (1969).
58 Id. at 330.
59 Id. at 335.
60 Id. at 334.
61 Id. at 331-32.
62 Id. at 336.
63 Id. at 333.

1968), aff'd per curiam sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394
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often levying the highest taxes.6 4 The Mclnnis court itself conceded this by its
statement: "Though districts with lower property valuations usually levy higher
tax rates, there is a limit to the amount of money which they can raise, especially
since they are limited by maximum indebtedness and tax rates." 5 (Emphasis
added.)
Although the Mclnnis court concluded that the existing school legislation
was neither arbitrary nor invidious, the key to its failure to find the educational
inequalities a violation of equal protection probably lies in its rationalization that:
"Even if the Fourteenth Amendment required that expenditures be made only
on the basis of pupils' educational needs, this controversy would be non-justiciable." 6' The Mclnnis court repeatedly emphasized that due to a lack of judicially
manageable standards, the plaintiffs must resort to the legislature rather than
the courts.6 1 The validity of the court's contention, however, is less than convincing in the light of Baker v. Carr,6" the landmark reapportionment case. In
that case the Supreme Court, finding that a challenge to Tennessee's legislative
apportionment scheme presented a justiciable issue, failed to adhere to its earlier
view that the remedy for unfairness in districting was to elect state legislatures that
would apportion properly, or to invoke the power of Congress.6" The Court also
failed to accede to the vigorously stated contention of dissenting Justice Frankfurter that judges lacked "... legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies
to draw upon for making judicial judgments""0 on state legislative apportionment
schemes. While offering no view as to proper constitutional standards or appropriate remedies to be applied,' the Baker opinion simply stated:
Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this action, ask the Court to
enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards
are lacking. Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment
of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they
must, that a discrimination
reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and
72
capricious action.

Although the one-man-one-vote doctrine was later developed by the courts,
Justice Frankfurter's dissent amply indicates no such simple standard was envisioned by the Court at the time Baker was decided.
64 See, e.e., Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 7, at 317; Silard & White, supra-note
7, at 9. See also 1 U.S. Comm'N ON CivIrL RIGHTS,

RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

25-31 (1967).
65 293 F. Supp. at 331.
66
67

Id. at 335.
Id. at 329, 332, 335, 336-37.

68
69

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 '(1946).

70 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Frankfurter repeatedly
referred to a lack of judicially manageable standards. See also id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissent-

ing).
71 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 556 (1964).
72

369 U.S. at 226.

73

The futility of appealing to the legislature is emphasized by Kurland's comment:
It should be noted that, to the extent that any voice in the legislatures of the states
has been strengthened by reapportionment, it is the voice of suburbia, the least likely,
I submit, to contribute to the effectuation of a concept of equal educational opportunity. Kurland, supra note 7, at 593.
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In Burruss v. Wilkerson,7 4 a case with a fact pattern closely resembling that
of Mclnnis, suit was brought by parents and students in Bath County, Virginia.
These plaintiffs challenged Virginia's statutory scheme for distribution of public
education funds because the apportionment formula worked to the disadvantage
of the relatively poor rural counties. In ordering a three-judge court, 5 Chief
Judge Dalton expressed a particularly enlightened view in which it appeared
relief might be granted:
The right to an equal educational opportunity was clearly recognized in
Brown v. Board of Education [Citation omitted]. While racial discrimination
is not an issue in this proceeding, at least one recent interpretation of this
right to an equal educational opportunity suggests that the right protects
individuals not only from discrimination on the basis of race, but also on
the basis of poverty. Hobson v. Hanson [sic] [Citation omitted]. Poverty does
appear to be a factor contributing to the conditions which give rise to the
plaintiffs' complaint. It is clear beyond question that discrimination based
on poverty is no more permissible than racial discrimination, and that the
discrimination on the part of state officials need not be intentional to be
condemned under the equal protection clause. See Griffin v. Illinois; Douglas
v. California;Harper v. Virginia State [sic] Board of Elections [Citations and
brief explanations omitted]. The rationale of those decisions appears to be
that state policies imposing conditions on the exercise of basic rights, which
conditions operate harshly upon the poor, must be clearly justified in order
to be constitutionally permissible."
However, the three-judge court took a different view and upheld the state
distribution formula, undoubtedly relying heavily on Mclnnis. The Burruss court
ascribed the existing deficiencies and differences solely to the absence of sufficient
taxable values within the county and concluded that since state funds were
distributed under a uniform and consistent plan, the state statutory distribution
scheme was not discriminatory. Conceding that the quest for equal educational
opportunities was "certainly a worthy aim, commendable beyond measure" and
that ".. . we must notice their beseeming, earnest and justified appeal for help,"
the Burruss court followed the Mclnnis principle by proclaiming: ".... the courts
have neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public
moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the State." The
General Assembly, the court noted, would undoubtedly come to their relief.7
Like Mclnnis, Burruss v. Wilkerson was summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in remanding Hargravefor consideration by a three-judge court, indicated its willingness to expand the rationale
for determining equality of educational opportunity considerably beyond that of
McInnis and Burruss. That court acknowledged that the equal protection argument of the plaintiffs was the "crux of the case." It further noted that "... lines
74
75
76
77

310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 301 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1968).
Id. at 1239-40.
310 F. Supp. at 574.

78

Id.

79

397 U.S. 44 (1970).
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drawn on wealth are suspect and... we are here dealing with interests which
may well be deemed fundamental....,8 However, Judge Bell, in his dissenting
opinion, felt that the equal protection argiment had already been decided by
Mclnnis.8"
In holding the Millage Rollback Act unconstitutional, the three-judge Hargrave court chose a considerably more cautious approach than that suggested by
the court of appeals. It did not step into the judicial vanguard to proclaim that
education is a fundamental interest-although it did not rule out that possibility.8 2
The court relied neither on the education cases involving racial discrimination,"
nor the poverty discrimination cases84 in arriving at its conclusion. In addition, to
answer Judge Bell's dissent s and thus avoid conflicting with the Mclnnis-Burruss
precedent, the Hargravecourt purported to distinguish Mclnnis and Burruss. On
cursory examination, Hargravemay therefore seem to leave the equal educational
,opportunity concept'where it found it. Closer scrutiny, however, reveals discrepancies between what the Hargrave decision purports to do and what it actually
does.
In attempting to distinguish Mclnnis and Burruss, the Hargrave court apparently relied on three distinctions: (1) plaintiffs in Mclnnis and Burruss were
challenging inequalities in distribution of educational funds whereas in Hargrave
plaintiffs were requesting the right to raise more funds; (2) there was a rational
basis for the Illinois statute whereas there was none for the Millage Rollback
Act; (3)' the Mclnnis court was confronted with a judicially unmanageable
standard whereas the Hargrave court could grant a simple injunctive remedy.
The first two of these distinctions may be more superficial than real.
Although it is true that the Mclnnis and Burruss complaints were primarily
challenges to the scheme of distributing educational moneys and Hargravewas a
challenge to a tax limitation for educational purposes, the underlying problem is
the same: may educational finance schemes ignore the educational needs of the
districts and thereby discriminate against the children in the poorer. .districts?
Stated another way, if Hargrave holds that a state must take into consideration
the educational needs of a district's children in setting a tax limitation for educational purposes, why must the state not take these same needs into consideration
in the collection and distribution of educational funds, or, for that matter, in
establishing the district boundary lines themselves? Certainly the question- forcefully put by the Hargrave court-"What interest has the State. of Florida in
preventing its poorer counties from providing as good an education for' their
children as its richer counties?"---might be as validly asked of the educational
finance schemes in Illinois or Virginia.
,
.

80 413 F.2d at,324.
81 Id. at 329 (Bell, J., dissenting).
82 The court stated:
Having concluded that there is no rational basis for the 'distinction which .the legislature has drawn, we decline the invitation to explore the fundamental-right-toan-education thesis, and thus we do not reach the more exacting "compelling interest"
approach. 313 F. Supp. at 948.,
83 See text accompanying notes 21-50 supra.
84 See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
,85 See text accompanying note'81 supra.
86 313 F. Supp. at 948.
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The second distinction drawn by Hargrave seems totally lacking in validity.
While the Hargrave court claims to find no rational basis for the Millage Rollback Act, it ignores several justifications for the Act which are at least as reason7
able as that used by the McInnis court to uphold the Illinois finance scheme.1
McInnis itself offers Hargrave a rational basis: "The maximum tax rates which
plaintiffs object to were enacted to avoid another disaster such as that which
struck certain localities during the Great Depression; the possibility of similar
economic crises supports the statutory ceilings.""8 Or the Hargrave court might
simply have found a rational basis in a tax limitation to prevent the majority from
imposing an excessive tax rate contrary to the will of the minority.
In ignoring these and other possibilities, the Hargrave court seems to be
applying a rational basis test that is equivalent to the compelling state interest
test, and thus it is in effect saying that before a state can justify a classification
which deprives the poor of equal educational opportunity, it must show a compelling state interest. This proposition gains support by the fact that each of the
cases cited by the Hargrave court in explaining its approach to the main issue
involved either a suspect classification or a fundamental interest.8 "
The third distinction drawn by Hargrave, availability of a manageable
standard, is probably the crucial factor in finding the Millage Rollback Act unconstitutional. As indicated earlier,"0 both Mclnnis and Burruss stressed the lack
of a manageable standard in failing to grant plaintiffs relief. The Hargrave court
could claim no such difficulty since the remedy sought was simply an injunction
to prevent the state from withholding certain educational funds from those
counties exceeding the ten-mill limit. Thus, Hargrave may stand for the proposition that where there is a manageable standard, economic educational inequalities
will be strictly scrutinized, whether or not education is a fundamental right. If
so, Hargrave casts doubt on the precedent of Mclnnis and Burruss since many
manageable standards for equitable collection and disbursement of educational
funds have been suggested by astute commentators, 9 any one of which may be
found acceptable by the courts.
Whether Hargrave has in effect imposed a more rigid standard of review
than traditionally used under the rational basis approach or whether it simply
finds irrational possible state objectives for the discriminatory classification, its
significance should not be underestimated. Viewed in its narrowest sense, the
decision undermines the constitutional validity of any tax limitation for educational purposes that fails to consider the educational needs of the districts and
thereby handicaps children in the poorer districts. Viewed in its broadest sense,
Hargrave indicates a significant break with the Mclnnis and Burruss precedent
and places the state in a position where it must show a compelling state interest
for ignoring educational needs in operating its educational finance program.
87 See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
88 293 F. Supp. at 333.
89 McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial
discrimination).
90 See text accompanying notes 66, 78 supra.
91 See, e.g., Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 7; Silard & White, supra note 7. at
25-30.
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Since Mclnnis, Burruss, and Hargrave unanimously recogize that there are
gross inequalities in existing educational finance programs and since state justifi~ations for allowing these inequalities seem inadequate at best, the Supreme Court
should affirm the Hargrave decision either by accepting the reasoning of the
Hargravecourt, or by taking this opportunity to declare education a fundamental
right. If, as declared in Brown, "[Education] is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms,"9 the affirmance of Hargravewill be a small, but
significant, step in that direction.
Victor 1.Koenig

LANDLORD-TENANT-IMPLIED COVENANT OF HArTABILTY-LANDLORD'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HOUSING CODE MAY BE USED AS DEFENSE FOR
NONPAYMENT OF RENT.-First National Realty Corporation [landlord] commenced separate actions against several of its tenants in the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions, Landlord and Tenant Branch, to repossess certain
leased premises for failure of the tenants to pay their rent. The tenants admitted
the failure of rental payments but alleged numerous violations of the District of
Columbia Housing Code as an equitable defense. The tenants offered to rove
the existence of approximately 1,500 direct and indirect violations of the Housing
Regulations of the District of Columbia in their apartment complex. The Court
of General Sessions refused the tenants' offer of proof and entered judgment for
the First National Realty Corporation. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Judge Hood presiding, affirmed, stating:
The long established rule in this jurisdiction, following the common law, is
that in the absence of statute or express covenant in the Iease, a landlord
does not impliedly covenant or warrant that the leased premises are in
habitable condition and the landlord is not obligated to make ordinary
repairs to the leased premises in the exclusive control of the tenant."
On appeal, Judge Skelly Wright reversed the decision of the lower courts
and held: housing code violations can be used as an equitable defense .orclaim
for recoupment in an action for possession based on nonpayment of.rent. Jains
v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1st Cir. 1970), -cert. denied,
91-S. Ct. 186 (1970).
Prior to the sixteenth century a lease was considered a contractual agreement
between two or more parties wherein the lessor contracted to grant the lessee
possession of the premises for a specified period. This contractual agreement was
effective only between lessor and lessee and therefore seldom gave the lessee protection from ejectment by persons other than the lessor.2 The present theories of
common law, which consider a lease to be a conveyance of an interest in land,
have changed little since their inception in the sixteenth century. The primary
obligation of the landlord in the common law lease theory is to deliver possession
92 347 U.S. at 493.
1
2

Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
SImpSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IhSTORY OF THE LAND LAW 68-71, 87-88 (1961).
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(or in some cases merely the right to possessions) to the tenant, and the tenant's
primary duty is to pay rent.4 Additionally, the landlord must not substantially
disturb the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises, and the tenant must not
commit waste against the landlord's reversionary interest. From these bare
foundations, the modem lease with all its special clauses and covenants evolved.
At common law, the remedies available to a tenant for breach of covenant
by:the landlord are insufficient. After delivery of possession by the landlord, there
are few incidents that can excuse the tenant from his duty of paying rent.5
One often used exception is the theory of constructive eviction. Constructive
eviction permits a tenant to cease paying rent and vacate the premises if the landlord substantially breaches his covenant to provide quiet enjoyment. 6 There are
several problems connected with this theory.
First, the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment must be so substantial
as to make the premises uninhabitable. This implies that any breaches of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment that fall short of destroying all habitability cannot
be used as the basis for constructive eviction. The amenities of life such as air
conditioning, elevator service, proper ventilation, sufficient lighting and proper
plumbing are usually not considered "necessities of life" and therefore would not
substantiate a constructive eviction. So long as there remain four walls and a
ceiling reasonably free of cracks, sufficient water for sanitary and personal use,
and a minimum form of utility service, the doctrine of constructive eviction
usually is not available to the tenant.
Second, the tenant must determine the severity of the breach of the covenant
at his own peril. Once the breach has occurred, the tenant must vacate the
premises within a "reasonable" period of time to attest to the breach. If later
the landlord sues for failure of rent payment, and the court rules that the breach
of quiet enjoyment was not substantial enough to render the premises uninhabitable, the tenant is required to pay all the rent due the landlord.7 Therefore,
most tenants hesitate to use this remedy for fear the court might later decide the
breach did not warrant abandonment of the premises.
Finally, as mentioned above, the tenant must attest to the severity of the
breach of the covenant by vacating the premises within a reasonable time after
the breach. In today's metropolitan areas, however, there is a sufficient shortage
of housing to make abandonment completely unreasonable.' Even if the tenant
is able to find another place to occupy, the chances are high that the conditions of
the new location will be little better than those just vacated. The tenant's posi-

3 Cobb v. Lavalle, 89 Ill. 331 (1878); Gazzalo v. Chambers, 73 II. 75 (1874). See 2

POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 225(1] (1967); 3 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE MODERN LAW Or REAL PROPERTY § 1130 (1959 Replacement).
4 SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 237.
5 See Simmons, Passion and Prudence, 15 Burr. L. REv. 572, 575 (1966); Note, 21
VAND. L. REv.' 1117, 1118 (1968).
6 See 1 AmERICAN LAW OP PROPERTY § 3.51 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 POWELL, supra note
3, at § 225[3]; 3 THOMPSON, supra note 3, at § 1132.
7 Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). See Bennett, The
Modern Lease, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 47, 65 (1938).
8 Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 480, 268 A.2d 556, 558 (1970).
See also Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 802 (1965).
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don in today's housing market is one of vastly unequal bargaining power-'characterized by "adhesion leases"' , and a "tAke it or leave it attitude."
Absent an express agreement to the contrary, the common law imposes no
duty on the landlord to 'Maintain the leased premises in a habitable condition."
2
This general rule is frequently characterized by the slogan "caveat 'emptor.'
The common law has been judicially and statutorily changed in many jurisdictions to hold the landlord liable in tort for injuries caused to the tenant by concealed dangerous conditions known to the landlord within the leased premises."
Also, many jurisdictions have provided criminal sanctions to force the landlord to
maintain the premises within the limits prescribed in the applicable ,housing
code. "
Although the tort liability of the landlord for injuries to the tenant caused
by concealed dangerous conditions known to the landlord on the premises has
given the tenant a cause of action against the landlord for the results-of disrepair,
its application is limited by the prerequisite of physical .injury. The criminal
sanctions imposed by housing codes have had some success in alleviating the
plight of the tenant,"s but their efficacy is largely hampered by a multitude of
problems readily evidenced by the large areas of substandard multiple dwellings
in every metropolitan area.16 Even if the sanctions of the housing codes could
be effectively enforced, there is a growing faction of "urban problem authorities"
9 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,
53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969):
10 See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant, 54 GA. L.J. 519, 555 (1966).
11 Kutcher v. Graft, 191 Iowa 1200, 184 N.W. 297 (1921); Auer v. Vahl, 129 Wis. 635,
109 N.W. 529 (1906). See I AmIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 6, at § 3.78; 2
POWELL, supra note 3, at § 225[2]. ,.But see Delarnater v. Forman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W.
148 (1931); Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis.2d 297, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
12 Nussbaum v. Sovereign Hotel Corp., 72 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1954); Pines v. Perssion, 14
Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Accord, Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922). See also 3 THomPsoN,
supra note 3, at § 1129; 45 MARQ. L. REV. 630 (1962).
13 Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942); Looney v. Smith, 96 N.Y.S.
607 (1950). 'See also PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358, Comment B (1966).
14
Prior to 1954, few large eastern cities had passed any housing codes. In 1954, in an
effort to safeguard federal funds spent on local redevelopment programs, Congress
enacted the workable program requirement, "which required each community to
develop a workable program ... to eliminate-and prevent the development or spread
of slums and urban blight." Certification of a workable p rogram by the HHFA
administrator was thus made a statutory condition to urban renewal loans and -grants
and other federal assistance.... The administrator prescribed several requirements
for a workable program, but one was the adoption of local housing codes. As a
result of this requirement, most communities now have housing codes. CASNER &
LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 507 n.16 (2d ed. 1969).

15

Housing code enforcement has had significant success in correcting expensive
structural deficiencies on a.city wide basis.. . . Code enforcement has failed, however,
effectively to impose standards of maintenance and sanitation, perhaps because of the
overwhelming difficuties in discovering these recurring deficiencies. (Emphasis
added.) Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HA.v. L. Rav. 801, 860

(1965).
16 "Nowhere, however, has code enforcement been completely successful in preventing the
development of slums or in preserving sound neighborhoods. In part this is due to administrative
and judicial failures.. . ." 'Id. at 801.
In Simmons, supra note 5, it is pointed out that "As a rough approximation, 'it appears
that one sixth of our urban population - over 5,000,000 families -- reside ina slum environment." Id. at 572 n.5.
"-. , .
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who feel that the landlords would merely pay the fines imposed by the codes and
raise the tenants'-rents to encompass this "new business expense."'"
It has been suggested that one possible solution to the substandard housing
problem would be to make "slumlordism" a tort. 8 This innovation would provide
the individual tenant with a method of obtaining compensation for damages
caused by inadequate and substandard housing conditions. Both constructive
eviction and-efficient enforcement of housing codes give the tenant a remedy for
immediate disrepairs, but they do not compensate the tenant for the damages
sustained. Treating slumlordism as a tort gives the tenant no immediate remedy. In fact, in some jurisdictions with a considerable backlog of cases, the
tenant would be forced to live in premises that are "causing him severe emotional distress" and humiliation 0 while the case is pending a decision.
Perhaps a more expeditious solution lies in treating the lease as a contract.
The common law theory that the landlord is not required to maintain and repair
the premises is a reflection of the attitude that the real value of a lease is not the
structure supplied to house the tenant (if any such structure existed) but rather
the value of the land itself. In previous centuries, in an agrarian economy, the
value of the land usually exceeded the value of any structure upon the land."0
Today this is no longer true. In today's cities, the economic concepts which
govern an agrarian society are no longer relevant. The average multiple dwelling
tenant has little or no interest in the land itself. He is concerned only with the
value of the apartment as suitable housing. It is true that there are still some
regions where the land value would be of primary importance in the lease, but
these are far outnumbered by urban leases. 2 '
The limitations of an agrarian society lease should have been discarded
long ago. Leases should be treated for what they actually are-contracts for
space usable for a specified purpose. The movement of the law is in the direction
of treating leases as any other type of contract:22
The task of modern courts has been to divorce the law of leases from
its medieval setting of real property law and adapt it to present day conwere only
ditions and necessities by means of contract principles, which
23
emerging when the law of landlord and tenant first developed.
The District of Columbia courts have shown no reluctance to apply contract
principles to leases. 24 Basic to the decision of Javins is the court of appeal's
belief that the lease should be governed by contract rather than property law:
17 See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 820
(1965); Note, Rent Withholding 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 318 (1965).
18 Sax and Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869 (1967).
19 Id. at 875.
20 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (1st Cir. 1970). See also 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 6, at § 3.78.
21 Javins v. First Nat'1 Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.39 (1st Cir. 1970).
22 For a few cases that have shown a tendency to treat a lease as a contract see Brown v.
Southhall Realty Co., 237 A.2d (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J.
444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1969); 6
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962).
23
24

Bennett, The Modern Lease, 16 TExAs L. REv. 47, 48 (1938).
See, e.g., Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
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Some courts have realized that certain of the old rules of property law
governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions....
In our judgment the trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise
and well considered. Our holding in this case reflects a belief that leases of
urban dwelling
units should be interpreted and construed like any other
25
contract.
At common law, the promises contained in a conveyance of an interest in
land were independent and separable." A breach on the part of the landlord
would not necessarily excuse the tenant from his duties under the lease.2 7 Consequently, the tenant would usually pay the rent specified in the lease even
though the landlord had failed to perform the duties assigned him by the
lease. The tenant's remedy was to sue the landlord for failure of performance
and have the court either extinguish the tenant's duty to pay rent or order the
landlord to perform.
Since contract law considers promises mutually dependent,2" a substantial
breach by either party excuses the offended party from further performance.
Using the theory of dependent promises as applied to a lease, the tenant has a
remedy against the landlord's failure to maintain the premises properly if it can
be proven that the promise of maintenance was part of the lease.
The Javins court found that the lease contains an "implied promise by the
landlord to maintain the premises in a suitable condition for habitation. This
implied warranty of habitability was found to exist in contract due to two
theories of law. First, since the lease is being considered and treated as a contract,
appropriate contract law was taken to imply a condition that the premises would
be suitable for the purpose they were intended.30 "Contract principles established
in other areas of the law provide a more rational framework for the apportionment of landlord tenant responsibilities; they strongly suggest that a warranty of
habitability be implied into all contracts for urban dwellings." 1 Second, the
Javins court followed precedents which held that the law existing at the time and
place of the making of a contract is deemed to be a part of the contract.3 2 The
laws existing at the time and place of the making of the lease in question included
25
26

Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (1st Cir. 1970).
See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant, 54 GA. L.J. 519, 535 (1966); 6
WILLSTON, CONTRACTS §§ 890-890a (3d ed. 1962).
27
At common law the lessor was, without express covenant to that effect, under no
obligation to repair, and if the demised premises became, during the term, wholly
untenable by destruction thereof by fire, flood, tempest or otherwise, the lessee
still remained liable for the rent unless exempted from such liability by some express
covenant in his lease. Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450, 454 (1873).
Accord, Walton v. Waterhouse, 85 Eng. Rep. 1235 n.(g) (1845); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra

note 6, at § 3.103.

28 See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HA.v. L. Rv. 801, 844
(1965).
29 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (Ist Cir. 1970); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
30 For other cases that found an implied warranty of habitability, see Marini v. Ireland,
56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Academy Spires Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 480,
268 A.2d 556, 558 (1970). Compare UNIFORs COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315.
31 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (Ist Cir. 1970).
32 See Schiro v. W. E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill.2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960).
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the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia." The District of Columbia
courts ruled in both Kanelos v.Kettler"4 and Brown v. Southhall Realty Co.5
that the housing codes impose a duty on the landlord to maintain the premises
according to the standards set forth therein. "In Whetzel V.Jess Fisher Management Co., 108 U.S. App. D.C. 385, 282 F.2d 934 (1960), we followed the
leading case of Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922), in holding
(1) that the housing code altered the common law rule and imposed a duty
to repair upon the landlord....
Through: these two theories, the Javins court held that there is an implied
warranty of habitability in all leases made within the jurisdiction of the Housing
Regulations of the District of Columbia. When this implied warranty of habitability is breached, the tenant is excused from further performance of his duties
under the lease. The extent and severity of the breach, as found by the trier of
fact, will determine the amount of payment (if any) the tenant is required to
continue paying the landlord. 7 The Javins court made it clear that -if the disrepair of the premises was due to the tenant's wrongful action, the landlord
could not be held to have breached the implied warranty of habitability.
It is paradoxical that the Illinois Supreme Court decided on November 18,
1970, that there is no implied warranty of habitability in modem leases and that
the covenants of a lease are independent real property covenants. That court,
in Jack Springs, Inc. v.Little"5 stated:
[A]ssuming arguendo that we adopt the rule that the covenant of habitability
express or implied, is mutual with the covenant to pay rent, we are then
faced with innumerable problems far beyond the capability of this or any
other court to deal with.9
It appears that the Javins court has seen no such overwhelming impediment.
The Javins decision is not a panacea for the slums of our metropolitan areas.
It is a step toward a realistic solution. Javins gives the initiative to the tenant to
withhold tent for abuses by the landlord, without burdening the tenant with the
necessity of instituting a court action.
Some of the questions yet to be answered are of major significance if the
Javins decision is to be widely followed. Most of the tenants in low income metropolitan areas are tenants at sufferance or tenancies from month to month. After
successfully defending an action for possession based on failure of rent payments,
these tenants can still be terminated on thirty days written notice.4" Another,
33 2 D.C. Register 47 (1955); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080
n.50 (1st Cir. 1970).
34 406 F.2d 951 (1st Cir. 1968).
35 237 A:2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
36 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (1st Cir. 1970).
37

Id. at 1082.

See also Charles E. Burt v. Seven Grand Corp., -

Mass. -,

163

N.E.2d 4 (1959); Academy Spires Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 480, 268 A.2d 556,
558 ('1970);-Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant, 54 GA. L.J. 519, 527 (1966);
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§

2-714.

38- Nos. 41730, 41739 cons. (Ill. S. Ct. Nov. 18, 1970). During a telephone conversation
on Feb. 46, 1971, Mr. Russell from the office of the Clerk of Courts, Illinois Supreme Court,
stated that the case was docketed for a rehearing on Mar. 23, 1971.
39 Id.
40 Simmons, supra note 5, at 588; Comment, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 152, 161 (1970).
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separate drawback to the acceptance of the Javins decision is that the tenant
must decide what will constitute a sufficient breach of the warranty of habitability
to justify withholding rent at his peril. If the trier of fact later disagrees with the
tehant and rules that withholdirig was not justified, the landlord will be granted
I
possession for failure of rent payment.
George H. Lyons

CONSTITuTIONAL LAW-STATuTE PROVIn)IN FOR SIx-MAN JURY iN TRIALS
OF NON-CAPITAL CASES DOES NOT VIOLATE SIXTH AMENDMENT.--Prior to his

trial for robbery in the state of Florida, defendant Johnny Williams filed a pre-

trial motion to impanel a twelve-man jury in place of the six-man jury provided
by Florida law.1 The motion was denied and Williams was convicted of robbery
and sentenced to life imprisonment. Williams appealed, contending that the

denial of his request for a twelve-man jury Violated his constitutional right to a
jury trial. Rejecting this contention, a Florida district court of appeal affirmed
the conviction.2 Since this court was the highest Florida court to which he could
appeal, Williams then sought and was granted certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the Florida court and held.: the
right to trial by jury guaranteed by .the sixth and fourteenth amendments is not
violated by a law providing for a jury of six in criminal trials. Williams v.
Florida,399 U.S. 78 (1970).3
The Williams decision overrules the long-standing historical test for delineating the essential features of a constitutional jury and perhaps presages an
effort to give flexibility to the application of the Bill of Rights to the states.
The -preservation of the right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings was
foremost among the many demands for amendments to the Constitution. Although article III of the Constitution guaranteed that "the trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by Jury," several states objected strongly
to the vagueness of this language and, in particular, to the absence of an explicit
vicinage requirement.4 At the Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry
protested that the article III jury trial provision had in reality sacrificed the jury
trial right by not expressly incorporating the vicinage rule.5 James Madison
sought to satisfy this objection when he introduced the forerunner of the present
sixth amendment. Madison's original amendment stated that "the trial of all
crimes ... shall be by an impartial jury of the freeholders of the vicinage, with
the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other
accustomed requisites . . . ?,6 However, the sixth amendment, as adopted,
1 FLA. STAT. § 913.10(1) (1967).
2 Williams v. State, 224 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
3

An additional issue in this case was the constitutionality of Florida's notice-of-alibi rule,
PROC. 1.200. The Court upheld the rule, rejecting Williams's claim that it

FLA. RULE CRIM.

violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
4 "Technically, 'vicinage' means neighborhood, and 'vicinage of the jury' meant: jury of
the neighborhood or, in medieval England, jury of the county." Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 93 n.35 (1970).
- 5 See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 25 (1951).
6 I ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
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provided that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... ." While this language eliminated the need for a vicinage requirement, in other respects it was scarcely more explicit than the article III jury trial
provision. The framers by and large left to the judiciary the task of filling the
interstices of the constitutional mandate of trial by jury.
The Supreme Court decided all questions about the form of a constitutional
jury on the basis of a simple historical test: the sixth amendment preserved all
the features of the common law jury that existed at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution. Since the common law jury numbered twelve in 1789, the
sixth amendment mandated a twelve-man jury.' And since the common law had
generally required unanimity among jurors in all their findings, the sixth amendment also required unanimous verdicts.'
The Court first expounded this historical test to resolve the question of the
number of jurors required by the Constitution in Thompson v. Utah.' An eightman jury in Utah had convicted Thompson of larceny shortly after Utah had
attained statehood. Utah's state constitution had provided for eight-man juries
in criminal proceedings, but Thompson had allegedly committed larceny while
Utah was still a territory. Undaunted, the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the
conviction and held that Utah's constitutional provision was applicable and that
the Federal Constitution, were it applicable, would not require a twelve-man
jury." With Justice Harlan writing the opinion in Thompson, the United States
Supreme Court reversed and held that Utah's eight-man jury rule was an ex post
facto law in regard to the defendant Thompson and that the Federal Constitution
did indeed mandate a twelve-man jury.
It must consequently be taken that the word "jury" and the words "trial by
jury" were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference
to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in
England at the time of the adoption of that instrument; and that when
Thompson committed the offense of grand larceny in the Territory of Utah
-the supreme law of the land required that he should be tried by a jury
composed of not less than twelve persons."
Justice Harlan's exposition of the historical test was remarkable in that he
omitted discussion of the essential premise of his argument. Justice Harlan quoted
the language of the Magna Carta" and the writings of common law scholars
such as Bacon and Story as authority for the clearly undebatable historical fact
of the twelve-man common law jury. Yet he offered no authority or historical
data to support his conclusion that the "jury" of the Constitution was the common law jury of Bacon and Story. His unsupported assumption was that the
7 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349 (1898).
8 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900).
9 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
10 State v. Thompson, 15 Utah 488, 50 P. 409 (1897).
11 170 U.S. at 350.
12 Id. at 349. For criticism of Justice Harlan's reliance on the Magna Carta, see Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
39 HARv. L. REv. 917, 922 n.14 (1926).
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framers intended to equate the constitutional jury and the common law jury."3
Despite this flaw in his argument, Justice Harlan's opinion established the historical test for determining the features of the jury required by the sixth amendment and received steadfast adherence in later cases. For example, in Maxwell
v. Dow,14 the Court cited Thompson and declared that "a jury composed, as
at common law, of twelve jurors was intended by the Sixth Amendment to the
Federal*Constitution, there can be no doubt."' 5
The Court again followed the Thompson rule in Rasmussen v. United
States, 6 a case which involved the constitutionality of the six-man jury in the
trial of misdemeanors in Alaska. Here, however, Thompson was not directly
challenged. The Court observed that "the Government did not deny that offenses
of the character of the one here prosecuted could only be tried by a common
law jury, if the Sixth Amendment governed."' 7 Rather than question the equation of the constitutional jury and the common law jury, the Government argued
that the Constitution was not controlling on Congress when it legislated for the
then territory of Alaska. But the Court rejected this argument and held that "the
provision of the act of Congress under consideration depriving persons accused
of a misdemeanor in Alaska of a right to trial by a common law jury, was
repugnant to the Constitution and void."'"
In Patton v. United States, 9 the Court considered whether an accused
could waive the right to be tried by a jury of twelve. The defendant's trial for
bribery of a federal prohibition agent had been interrupted by the illness of one
of the jurors. All parties had agreed to continue the trial with the eleven jurors
then impaneled. After a guilty verdict, the defendant Patton appealed and
claimed that he had no power to waive his constitutional right to a twelve-man
jury. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and held the jury trial provision
was not jurisdictional but "was meant to confer a right upon the accused which
he may forego at his election."2 In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court
gave the historical test its most dogmatic restatement:
[W]e first inquire what is embraced by the phrase "trial by jury." That it
means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and
England when the Constitution was adopted, is not open to question. Those
elements were-(1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither
more nor less; (2) that the trial should be in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them as to the law and
advise them in respect of the facts; and (3) that the verdict should be
unanimous.
As to the first of these requisites, it is enough to cite Thompson v.
Utah . .1 (Emphasis added.)
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

170 U.S. at 349-50.
176 U.S. 581 (1900).
Id. at 586.
197 U.S. 516 (1905).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 528.
281 U.S. 276 (1930).
Id. at 298.
Id. at 288.
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In none of these cases did the Court ever scrutinize Justice Harlan's assumption that the framers intended to incorporate all the features of the historical
common law jury into the sixth amendment. The Thompson rule was never
directly challenged. Furthermore, it was not likely to be challenged as long as it
only burdened the federal government.
Maxwell v. Dow22 first presented the question of whether the fourteenth
amendment required that the states adhere to the sixth amendment jury trial
guarantee in state criminal proceedings. Maxwell again involved a conviction by
an eight-man jury in Utah. Here there was no ex post facto issue as in Thompson
since the alleged robbery occurred after Utah became a state. Thus Maxwell
squarely presented the question of the applicability of the sixth amendment to the
states. The Supreme Court, however, was not yet ready in 1900 to give a broad
interpretation to the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Specifically, the
Court declared that the right to trial by jury in criminal proceedings "has never
been affirmed to be a necessary requisite of due process of law."2"
The present era has, of course, seen a broader interpretation of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The Court in recent cases has selectively
incorporated various Bill of Rights guarantees into the due process clause and applied these guarantees to the states.24 Although Justice Black's total incorporation
approach" has never won a majority of the Court, the cumulative effect of the
selective incorporation cases has in effect established a national code of criminal
procedure based on practically the entire Bill of Rights. Duncan v. Louisiana"
contributed to this result by adding the jury trial guarantee. Specifically, Duncan
held "that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee."2
Duncan clearly overruled Maxwell but its exact impact was not immediately
clear. Only Louisiana, New York, and New Jersey had provisions for trial without jury under circumstances where the right to trial by jury would be guaranteed
on the federal level.2" A greater number of states, however, did provide jury
trials but in a different form than the federal jury (e.g., Florida's six-man jury
in non-capital cases)."' The impact of Duncan on these latter states depended
22 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
23 Id. at 603.
24 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (fifth amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (sixth amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth
amendment); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment).
25 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 122 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
26 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
27 Id. at 149.
28 Louisiana and New Jersey enacted statutes to comply with Duncan v. Louisiana. LA.
CRIM. PRo. CODE ANN. art. 779 (Supp. 1970); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:169-4 (Supp. 1970).
New York's scheme for trial without jury in the New York City Criminal Court, N.Y.C. CRIM.
CT. ACT § 40 (Supp. 1970), was struck down by the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
29 In addition to Florida's six-man jury statute, Louisiana, South Carolina, Texas, and
Utah have provisions for juries of less than twelve in trials of serious offenses: LA. CONST. art.
7, § 41; LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 779 (Supp. 1970) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-618 (1962);
Tax. CONST. art. 5, § 17; Tx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 37.02 (1966); UTAH CONST. art. 1, §
10; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-5 (1953). For a poll of other state practices which differ from
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on whether that decision incorporated judicial accretions such as the Thompson
rule in addition to the explicit language of the sixth amendment jury trial provision. Prior incorporation decisions indicated that the Thompson decision would
also apply against the states since, by selective incorporation, "the fourteenth
amendment incorporates specific provisions of the Bill of Rights and those that
are 'absorbed' at all are incorporated whole and intact, providing protections
against the states exactly congruent with those against the federal government.""0
Justice Brennan, the leading spokesman of the selective incorporation
theory,"1 emphasized this aspect of the incorporation approach in Malloy v.
Hogan.2 There Justice Brennan responded to the contention that the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be enforced according to
different standards for the states and the federal government:
The State urges, however, that the availability of the federal privilege to a
witness in a state inquiry is to be determined according to a less stringent
standard than is applicable in a federal proceeding. We disagree. We have
held that the guarantees of the First Amendment .. ., the Fourth Amendment.., and ... the Sixth, Amendment are all to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards
that protect those personal rights against federal encroachment ....
The
Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to the States only a "watered-down, subjective version of the individual
'
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 83
(Citations omitted.)
This uniform standard corollary is the "real bite" 4 of the selective incorporation theory. It is argued that applying' the specifics of the Bill of Rights against
the states with all the overlays that the Court has developed for the federal courts
imposes a needless uniformity which is inconsistent with our system of federalism.35 Duncan seemed particularly susceptible to this criticism, especially in the
application of the twelve-man jury standard to the states. All commentators
have agreed that there is nothing sacrosanct about the number twelve. Justice
White encountered this objection in the Court's opinion in Duncan:
Louisiana also asserts that if due process is deemed to include the right
to jury trial, States will be obligated to comply with all past interpretations
of the Sixth Amendment, an amendment which in its inception was designed
to control only the federal courts and which throughout its history has
operated in this limited environment where uniformity is a more obvious
and immediate consideration. In particular, Louisiana objects to application of the decisions of this Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment as guarthe federal standard of jury trial, see Appendix to Opinion of Harlan, J., Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 138-42 (1970). .See also Holtzoff, Modern Trends in Trial by Jury, 16 WASx. &
LEE L. REv. 27, 34-35 (1959).

30 Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74

(1963).

31 See Justice Brennan's opinions in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960);
Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 154 (1960). See also his article, The Bill of Rights and the
States, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 761 (1961).
32 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
33 Id. at 10-11.
34 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALiF. L. Rnv. 929,

935 (1965).
35

See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1964). (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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anteeing a 12-man jury in serious criminal cases, Thompson v. Utah... as
requiring a unanimous verdict before guilt can be found, Maxwell v.
Dow .... It seems very unlikely to us that our decision today will require
widespread changes in state criminal processes. First, our decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment are always subject to reconsideration .... 31
Justice Fortas in his concurring opinion was less ambiguous. He argued that
the uniform standard rule was inappropriate for the jury trial provision:
This Court has heretofore held that various provisions of the Bill of
Rights such as freedom of speech and religion guarantees of the First
Amendment, the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in the
Fourth Amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth
Amendment, and the right to counsel and to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment "are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal
rights against federal encroachment." I need not quarrel with the specific
conclusion in those specific instances. But unless one adheres slavishly to the
incorporation theory, body and substance, the same conclusion need not be
superimposed upon the jury trial right ....While we may believe (and I do
believe) that the right of jury trial is fundamental, it does not follow that the
particulars of according that right must be uniform. 37 (Citations omitted.)
The majority of the Court did not immediately accept Justice Fortas's
view, but it did soon commit itself to the reconsideration of the federal standard
for jury trials which Justice White had suggested. In De Stefano v. Woods, 8 the
Court refused to give Duncan retroactive application, reasoning that the effect of
a holding of general retroactivity on the adminstration of justice would be severe.
The Court pointed to the number of convictions in Louisiana where a sixth
amendment argument could be made, and added that "depending on the Court's
decisions about unanimous 12 man juries, all convictions for serious crimes
in certain other States would be in jeopardy." 9
The effect of such language by the Court was to suspend the total impact
of the Duncan decision. Although, theoretically, the prohibitions against juries
of less than twelve members and non-unanimous verdicts were applicable against
the states, their courts did not change over to the federal standard.40 The
Florida district court of appeal, by citing Duncan, had summarily rejected
Williams's claim of right to trial by jury of twelve.' Such a state reaction was
understandable considering the ambiguity of the Court's position. The promised
reconsideration of past decisions became imperative in order to remove the
sixth amendment right to jury trial from the limbo created by Duncan and De
Stefano. Williams provides the first part of this reexamination by presenting the
twelve-man jury issue. In Williams the Court examines questions which past
decisions involving the required number of jurors had simply glossed over: the
36
37
38
39
40
41

391 U.S. at 158 n.30.
Id. at 214.
392 U.S. 631 (1968).
Id. at 634.
See, e.g., State v. Caston, 256 La. 459, 236 So. 2d 800 (1970).
Williams v. State, 224 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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origin of the twelve-juror rule and the intent of the framers to preserve this rule
in the sixth amendment.'
Lord Devlin suggests that there are twelve jurors for the same reason there
are twelve pennies to the English shilling: the early English abhorrence of the
decimal system.42 However, Justice White, again writing for the Court, quotes
Lord Coke's explanation that the "'number of twelve is much respected in holy
writ, as 12 apostles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc. . . .," and notes that plausibility
of this solution is verified by the early English oath for jurors: "Hear this, ye
Justices! that I will speak the truth of that which ye shall ask of me on the part
of the king, and I will do faithfully to the best of my endeavor. So help me God,
and these holy Apostles.""' Whatever the explanation, Justice White concludes
that the choice of twelve and only twelve jurors does not derive from the purpose
which gave rise to the jury trial.45
The fact that the twelve-juror standard was strictly a historical appendage
seemed irrelevant in previous decisions. The Court had consistently followed
Justice Harlan's assumption in Thompson that the framers intended to incorporate every feature of the common law jury into the sixth amendment, whether
any particular feature was accidental to the jury trial right or not. In Williams
the Court finally refutes this assumption and discards the historical test. While
acknowledging that there is not any conclusive evidence of the framer's intent in
regard to the jury trial guarantee, Justice White marshalls persuasive data to show
that the framers did not desire that the sixth amendment jury be forever restricted
to its 1789 form. Justice White relies primarily on the opposition and changes to
Madison's original version of the sixth amendment. 5 His reliance seems well
placed. If the framers had adopted Madison's initial draft of the amendment
with its explicit language preserving the jury and all its "accustomed requisites"
their intent to perpetuate the jury in its historical common law form would have
been indisputable. But the framers rejected Madison's draft. They replaced the
common law vicinage requirement with a more precise provision and deleted
altogether the "unanimity" and "accustomed requisites" language. It could be
argued that these changes and deletions were made simply to prevent redundancy
in the language of the Constitution since in 1789 the word "jury" meant a jury
according to common law standards and these standards need not be included.
But the Court takes the opposite position, stating that the changes were meant to
have substantive effect.4 Noting additionally that in several other enactments
the framers had left no doubt as to their intent to incorporate common law
standards (e.g., the seventh amendment4 8 ), Justice White concludes that there
is insufficient evidence to substantiate the premise underlying past decisions concerning the twelve-man requirement:
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

P. DEVLIN, TRIAL HY JuRY 8 (rev. ed. 1966).
399 U.S. at 88.
Id. at 89 n.23.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 93-96.
Id. at 97.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Summer, 1971]

Where is absolutely no indication in "the intent of the Framers" of an
explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common law characteristics of the jury. Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do
violence to the letter of the Constitution by turning to other then purely
historical considerations to determine which features of the jury system, as it
existed at common law, were preserved in the Constitution.49
The Court substitutes a functional approach for the discarded historical test.
Whether or not any particular feature of jury practice is constitutionally required
in criminal trials hinges upon "the function that the particular feature performs
and its relation to the purposes of the jury trial."50 Whereas the assumed intent
of the framers was the foundation of the historical test, the new test depends on
the Court's determination of the purpose of jury trial. Williams resolves this
question by reiterating the Duncan concept of the jury as a political institution.5
The purpose of jury trial is to prevent governmental oppression of the criminally
accused by "the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor" and "the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge."52 Although the threat of government oppression may seem to
be a flimsy basis to justify trial by jury, Kalven and Zeisel's empirical study of
American jury trials offers statistics to support this supposition.5" Their study of
3576 criminal trials showed some form of judge-jury disagreement in 33.8% of
the trials. Disagreement on guilt or innocence was present in 19.1% of the trials
with the jury acquitting in 16.9% of the cases where the judge would have convicted. On the other hand, judges stated that they would have acquitted where
the jury convicted in only 2.2% of the trials. The spread on all types of judgejury disagreement generally reflected this spread on the issue of guilt or innocence.
Of the 33.8% total, the jury was more lenient to the defendant in 28.3% of
the trials while the judge was more lenient in 5.5 %." While these statistics are
not conclusive proof of the reality of governmental oppression in criminal trials,
they do clearly demonstrate the vital role of the jury as a political institution.
Considering the twelve-juror standard in light of this functional test, Justice
White reasons:
Given this purpose, the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the common sense judgment
of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared
responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence. The performance of this role is not a function of the particular
number of the body that makes up the jury. To be sure, the number should
probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside
attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross section of the community. 55
Rejecting contentions that juries of less than twelve might be disadvantageous to defendants or less likely to be representative of the community, Justice
49
50
51
52

399 U.S. at 99.
Id. at 99-100.
See Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLUAL. L. Rv. 419, 424-26 (1969).
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
53 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE. AMERICAN JURY (1966).
54 Id. at 62.
55 399 U.S. at 100.
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White reaffirms that the common law composition of -the jury is a historical
accident unrelated to the purposes for jury trial. But he does not say that
Congress or the states cannot or should not fix the number of jurors in accordance
with the common law rule. The Court in Williams holds that since the number
of jurors is not integrally related to the purpose of jury trials, Congress and the
states are simply not required by the Constitution to forever fix that number at
twelve.5 6
Justices Harlan and Stewart concurred in the result. Justice Harlan, however, was highly critical of the circuitousness employed to produce the result:
The historical argument by which the Court undertakes to justify its
view that the Sixth Amendment does not require 12-member juries is, in
my opinion, much too thin to mask the true thrust of this decision. The

decision evinces, I think, a recognition that the "incorporationist" view of

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which underlay
Duncan .. .must be tempered to allow the States more elbow room in

ordering their own criminal systems. With that much I agree. But to accomplish this by diluting constitutional protections within the Federal system
itself is something to which I cannot possibly subscribe. Tempering the rigor
of Duncan should-be done forthrightly, by facing up to, the fact that at least
in this area the "incorporation" doctrine does not fit well with our federal
structure, and by the same token that Duncan was wrongly decided.57
Justice Harlan views Williams as a "backlash" decision since the consequence of holding that-the twelve-juror standard is not required of the states is
to hold that the standard is not required of the federal. government either. While
selective incorporation is presumably meant "to raise the standards of individual
protection... to the higher federal level,"' 8 the Court in Williams does allow a
dual standard for the incorporated jury trial guarantee. Thus Williams seems inconsistent with Malloy which inveighed against the application of a "watered' to the states. But the majority of the Court
down version of the Bill of Rights" 59
dearly remains committed to the, Malloy uniform standard principle." Williams
then must be interpreted as a refinement of selective incorporation and a limitation of the Malloy approach to procedures and practices integrally related to the
specifics of the Bill of Rights. It also may signify that the Court will give greater
recognition to what one commentator has termed "procedural differences [which]
represent different ways of achieving constitutionally adequate implementation ... ..

6

Such a development would give flexibility to the selective incorpo-

ration theory and permit a pragmatic approach to local problems of judicial administration. In particular, the Court's acceptance of the six-man jury as a
permissible mode of implementing the jury trial guarantee should mean a minimization of delay and court congestion. The reasoning underlying recent experi56 Id. at 103.
57 Id. at 118.
58 Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the'FourteenthAmendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 77
(1963).
59 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
60 - See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969).
,61
Hill, The Bill of'Rights and.the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 181, 191
(1969).
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ments and proposals' for smaller juries in civil trials applies with at least equal
force to criminal trials. A recent experiment in San Francisco is illustrative:
A judge trying to speed up the wheels of justice has started using juries
of six members instead of 12, and reports it works great.
The jury returned an innocent verdict Wednesday after 17 minutes of
deliberation.
"It was aimed at streamlining the process of justice, and in this case
it certainly did the job," Municipal Court Judge John O'Kane said in an
interview.
He said that the smaller jury saves time in selection that reduces costs,
because jury members are paid for their time in court.6 3
The Supreme Court still must decide whether the unanimous verdict rule
should be applied against the states as part of the jury trial guarantee.64 The
resolution of this issue should more clearly indicate how much local variation the
Court will allow in the implementation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
which have been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice White refers to the unanimity rule in Williams when discussing the essential role of the jury. He states that the goals of group deliberation, and true representation of the community can be achieved with fewer
jurors, "particularly if the requirement of unanimity is retained."65 The implication that the constitutionality of a jury of less than twelve members would be
contingent upon retention of the unanimity rule is negated by the accompanying
footnote where Justice White says: "We intimate no view whether or not the
requirement of unanimity is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment
jury trial."6
Only Louisiana and Oregon allow non-unanimous verdicts in trials of
felonies.6" But England in 1967 changed its law to permit non-unanimous
verdicts in criminal trials, apparently in reaction to frequent reports of jurors
being bribed in order to bring about hung juries.6" One commentator suggests
that since the possibility of jurors being reached by bribes exists in the United
States just as in England, the unanimity requirement should be abolished here as
well.6 However, Kalven and Zeisel's study showed hung juries in only 51% of
62 See Cronin, Six-Member Juries in District Courts, 2 BosToN B.J. no. 4, 27 (1958);
Tamm, The Five-Man Civil jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo. L.J. 120
(1962); Wiehl, The Six-Man jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 35 (1968).
63 South Bend Tribune, Nov. 19, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
64 The United States Supreme Court has noted jurisdiction of an appeal from a ruling of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana which upheld Louisiana's provision for non-unanimous verdicts.
State v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So. 2d 825 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199
(U.S. Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 5161).
65 399 U.S. at 100.
66 Id. at 100 n.46.
67 LA. CONST. art. 7, § 41; LA. CRIm. PRo. CODE ANN. art. 782 (1966); ORE. CONST.
art. 1, § 11; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 136.330, 136.610 (1967). The Supreme Court of Oregon
has recently held that Oregon's non-unanimous verdict provisions are constitutional. See State
v. Gann, 463 P.2d 570 (Ore. 1969).
68 For a summary of the background to the passage of this law and the role played by
Kalven and Zeisel's empirical study, see Kalven & Zeisel, The American jury: Notes for an
English Controversy, 48 CHI. B. REC. no. 7, 195 (1967).
69 Ryan, Less Than Unanimous Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. Cuax. L.C. & P.S. 211,
217 (1967).
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the trials. If verdicts of ten or eleven of the twelve jurors had sufficed for a
verdict, 34% of these hung juries would have convicted, 8% acquitted. Yet in
none of these instances of hung juries did the trial judge suggest that juror corruption was the reason for the deadlock. 0
When the question of unanimity presents itself, it is possible that the Court
will adopt the argument of the Sixth Circuit that unanimity is required by due
process since it is "inextricably interwoven" with the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."- However, the Court should be able to reaffirm the unanimity rule solely in terms of the Williams criteria. For where the possibility of
government oppression exists (e.g., in areas where laws are enforced in a discriminatory fashion), the majority verdicts of six or less will likely only mirror
the oppression exercised by elected officials. Even assuming that the jury
sufficiently survives peremptory challenges to represent a fair cross-section of
the community, it can quickly become unrepresentative without the unanimity
requirement. The vote of a member of a minority group on the jury can be
ignored with the result that the jury, rather than preventing government oppression, could become a vehicle for legalizing majority oppression.
Interposing a group of untrained laymen between the accused and the accuser works best when the group acts as a group by deliberating on the genuine
issue. Unanimity serves to foster this group interaction.'2 One dissenting juror
can compel a discussion of relevant facts which might otherwise never occur.
Kalven and Zeisel's study demonstrated that jury deliberation, though limited
by the psychological pressures inherent in every group activity, resulted in an
initial minority of jurors reversing an initial majority on the issue of guilt in 10%
of the trials.7 3 Without unanimity, this percentage will surely decrease. Finally,
unanimity gives the community, which participates in the determination of guilt
or innocence and shares the responsibility for such a determination, the greatest
possible assurance that the determination is just and correct.7
Unlike the twelve-man rule, unanimity is integrally related to the purpose
of a jury trial and, therefore, is appropriately a uniform standard for the states
and the federal government. A decision that Duncan only incorporates the right
to trial by a jury of six or less which can render a non-unanimous verdict would
sacrifice justice for expediency and would signify an emasculation of the selective
incorporation theory rather than a refinement such as existed in Williams.
Thomas L. Young

70 Kalven & Zeisel, The American jury: Notes for an English Controversy,48 CHi. B. REC.
no. 7, 195 (1967).
71 Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). But cf. Comment,
Waiver of jury Unanimity-Some Doubts About Reasonable Doubt, 21 U. Cxi. L. Rav. 438,
441-43 (1954).
72 United States v. FioraVanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969).
73 H. KALWzN & H. ZErsEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 490 (1966).
74 Cf. Comment, Should jury Verdicts Be Unanimous in Criminal Cases? 47 ORE. L. Rav.
417, 424 (1968).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SCHOOL LAw-PUBLIC BOARD MAY SUMMARILY TER
MINATE A PROBATIONARY TEACHER'S EMPLOYMENT AT EXPIRATION OF THE EM-

PLOYMENT TERM; THERE

Is

No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONTINUED

EMPLOYMENT.

After careful consideration with the appropriate department members concerning future staffing requirements .

.

. we have reached the conclusion

that your services will no longer be needed ....
Benjamin Solomon and Dr. Ida Lalor were nontenured' associate professors
at Chicago State College.' On November 25, 1968, they received a short letter
from the Dean of Faculty advising them that they would not be retained beyond
expiration of their present term.
For the Dean of Faculty, the letters were the beginning of the end of the
professors' association with the college; but for the professors, this was neither
the beginning, nor an acceptable end, to their dealings. They felt that the reasons
for nonretention could be traced to their activities during 1968 when they unsuccessfully attempted to gain collective bargaining privileges for the faculty of
the college and initiated campuswide discussions on racism. 4 Apparently they
thought the motivation for the decision not to retain them sprang from the administration's desire to purge the faculty of union leaders and shut off discussion
of controversial but academically relevant subjects.' Solomon and Lalor felt that
1 Record at C-10, Appendix A, Fooden v. Bd. of Governors, Nos. 42460, 42461 (Ill. S.
Ct., Jan. 25, 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Record].
2 Id. at C-40, Exhibit C. Their probationary contract reads: "This is to notify you that
• . you were appointed . . . on a ten-month basis . . .. [X] Probationary-2nd Year, [ ]
Tenured (granted only by special Board action) . . . ." In the body of the contract it is
provided: "Appointments . . . are subject to all provisions of the Bylaws, Governing Policies,
"
and Practices of the Board ....
The notice of nonretention met the standards of timeliness set by the American Association
of University Professors: "[T]he Association prescribes, in its statement on the Standards for
Notice of Nonreappointment, that faculty members in their first year of service should be given
notice by March 1, in their second year by December 15, and thereafter a year in advance.
. . ." Davis, Principles and Cases: The Mediative Work of the AAUP, 56 AAUP BULL. 169
(1970).
[Chicago State College] is a degree-granting institution for the education 'of
3
The school enrolled 2,085 men and 2,931 women attending classes on
teachers ....
the Main Campus and West Center Campus in 1969. The college was founded in
1869 and offers . . . vital, forward-looking programs of teacher education ....
Special programs are offered for the culturally disadvantaged as well as American
Negro history." 3 THE COLLEGE BLUE Boox, 1969/'70 165 (13th ed. 1970).
4 Graduate students protested the administrative action of President Byrd in a letter
entitled, "A Statement Concerning the Non-Retention of Dr. Lalor and Mr. Solomon" signed
by Ralph Faust Jr., Dale Harger, Phil Crump, and Eve V. Evans. At Part IV(l) of the letter
the students said: "Dr. Lalor and Mr. Solomon are at the forefront of union activity at Chicago
State College. . . . By dismissing Dr. Lalor and Mr. Solomon, the Administration can undermine the union strength. . . ." The letter went on to point out that Dr. Lalor was the director
of the program entitled Masters of Education in Teaching the Socially Disadvantaged Child,
and Mr. Solomon was chairman of the American Federation of Teachers Committee on Racism
in Education. The students imply that the administration was opposed to "progressivism" in
the fight against racism.
The Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, American Federation of Teachers
(AFL-CIO) took a leading role in the teachers' court action. On June 17, 1968, they issued
a Special Bulletin appealing for $1200 needed to prosecute the appeal and asked that checks
be made payable to the "Lalor-Solomon Legal Defense Fund." The union members also published a newsletter entitled "Common Sense" which carried a lead article concerning the
decision not to retain the two professors. Common Sense, June 1969, at 1, col. 2.
5 Record at C-9.
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their fourteenth amendment rights of procedural due process had been infringed
by the summary action.8
On April 7, 1969, Solomon and Lalor filed a complaint in the Circuit Court
of Sangamon County, Illinois, Chancery Division, asserting on information and
belief that their union membership and open discussion of racism were the basis
for the action of the Dean of Faculty.7 On April 29, 1969, the Board of Governors of the college filed a motion for summary judgment, together with the supporting affidavit of the executive officer and secretary of the board* When no
counter-affidavits were forthcoming from the plaintiffs and after argument on
the -motion, the circuit court granted summary judgment.' In their direct appeal' to the Illinois Supreme Court, the teachers asserted: "It is unconstitutional
for a public institution to remove an employee without a prior, specific statement of reasons given to the employee.?" 0 After lengthy analysis of the procedural
steps taken at the circuit court level, the Illinois Supreme Court held: a board
may summarily terminate a probationary teacher's employment at the end of his
employment term, and there is no constitutional right to continued employment.
Fooden v. Board of Governors, Nos. 42460, 42461 (Ill. S. Ct., Jan. 25, 1971).
Professors Solomon and Lalor found strong support for their alleged denial
of procedural rights in the recent federal decision of Roth v. Board of Regents."
In that case an assistant professor at Wisconsin State University had been retained
on a probationary one-year contract. When the time for renewal of the contract
came, he was notified that a contract would not be offered for the next year.
The university president gave no reason for the decision. No hearing was requested and none was held, but an action was filed in the United States district
court for alleged violation of the plaintiff's procedural rights under the fourteenth
6 Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Fooden v. Bd. of Governors, Nos. 42460, 42461 (Ill. S.
Ct., Jan. 25, 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Brief for Appellants].
7 Record at C-7, C-8.

8 Fooden v. Bd. of Governors, Nos. 42460, 42461 at 2-3 (Ill. S. Ct., Jan. 25, 1971).

Donald Paull and Ruth Nedelsky, teachers at Chicago State College, filed a nearly identical
complaint on May 8, 1970, in the United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division. In his judgment for the Board, Judge Richard B. Austin held that:
Neither the plaintiffs' contracts, nor any statute, regulation or practice governing
the College, gave any right or created any expectancy that their contracts would be
renewed beyond the expiration of the contract term. Unlike tenured faculty members,
the plaintiffs were not entitled by statute, regulation, practice or contract to a statement of reasons for the nonrenewal of their contracts or to a hearing to determine if
adequate cause existed for non-renewal.
Cook County College Teachers Local 1600 v. Byrd, Civil No. 70 C 1086 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 5,

1970).

Robert Thaw, a probationary teacher for the Dade Couity (Florida) School Board,
alleged in Thaw v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1970), that
without asserting a violation of constitutional rights it was still imperative that a hearing
"be held to assure that the 'real basis for separation is not bottomed on conduct that is or should
be constitutionally protected.' " Judge Thornberry held: "It would be too much to ask the
school board to hold a hearing every time it determines not to renew the contract of a probationary teacher, or even every time a terminated teacher requests a hearing without alleging
unconstitutional action."
9 Ill. S. Ct. (Civ.) R. 302.
10 Brief for Appellants at 30.
11 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 18490 (7th Cir., filed -,
1970). In support of their basic proposition they also cited Olson v. Regents of the Univ. of
Minnesota, 301 F. Supp. 1356 (D. Minn. 1969), and Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112
(D. Mass. 1969). Both cases are easily distinguishable on the facts. Olson involved a civil
service employee with fourteen years' service who was dismissed without any prior notice. Lucia
involved a probationary teacher dismissed 'without notice provided for in his contract.
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amendment. The assistant professor claimed there had been a failure to provide
a reason for the decision or a hearing as to the merits of the decision." District
Court Judge James E. Doyle found himself bound to undertake a balancing
process he found described in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy." Whether a nontenured teacher had the rights sought could only be determined, he stated,
by weighing "... . the precise nature of the government function involved as well
as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."'" After
admitting that the board's loss of its power to summarily find that a probationary
teacher's contract would not be renewed presented a potential danger to the
central missions of teaching and research, Judge Doyle nevertheless concluded:
I hold that minimal procedural due process includes a statement of the
reasons why the university intends not to retain the professor, notice of a
hearing at which he may respond to the stated reasons, and a hearing if
the professor appears at the appointed time and place. At such a hearing
the professor must have reasonable opportunity to submit evidence relevant
to the stated reasons.' 5
A divergent view of the procedural rights owed to a probationary teacher
is offered in the case of Jones u. Hopper. 6 In that case a professor had served
two probationary or nontenured terms at Southern Colorado State College. He
was then notified that he would not be retained for the next term. Filing suit in
district court under § 1983 for denial of his right of expectancy of continued
employment, the professor asserted that the board's decision not to retain him was
a denial of his free exercise of first amendment rights. When his case went to
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court found that on the face of the
complaint there was no demonstrated "right of expectancy to continued employment." ' Absent the jurisdictional claim under § 1983 that the board's conduct
subjected the professor "to a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Federal Constitution and laws," the court held the plaintiff had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.'
Although the professor did not specifically demand procedural due process
either in the form of a statement of reasons for dismissal or in the form of a hearing, the court took it upon itself to determine whether a probationary teacher's
employment could be summarily denied:
It has become a settled principle that government employment, in the
absence of legislation, can be revoked at the will of the appointing officer...

12

Roth also alleged violation of first and fifth amendment rights which are not the subject

of this comment.
13 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
14 Id. at 895.
15 310 F. Supp. at 980.
16 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970).
17 Id. at 1326.
1970), where the court said:
18 See Shirk v. Thomas, 315 F. Supp. 1124, 1125 (S.D. Ill.
"This court holds that a complaint by a former probationary school teacher, stating only that
she was dismissed upon proper notice and in conformity with State law, fails to state a cause
of action for which relief may be granted."
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subject, however, to the restriction that unreasonable conditions may not be
imposed upon the granting of public employment.' 9
The court stated that, by summarily deciding on nonretention, the president and
board of the college were exercising a discretion granted by statute.2" Acknowledging the special needs of the college, the judges deferred to the wishes of the
legislature which "intended to commit to the sound judgment of the regents"
the responsibility of determining whether the interests of the institution would be
promoted by dispensing with the services of a particular professor. 2
The Jones and Roth cases represent the edges of a broad field of legal interpretation. In both cases the spectrum used to filter and project opinion was
Cafeteria Workers.22 Originally that case was not accepted as a useful or desirable
expression of constitutional law.2" The Supreme Court's opinion was described
as a "regression to the question-begging 'privilege v. right' reasoning."24 Nevertheless, Cafeteria Workers remains viable, perhaps because of its apparent ambiguity, and certainly because catch-phrases have lent themselves to the kind of
wide-range extemporizing found in Jones and Roth.2"
In Goldberg u. Kelly,2" Justice Brennan, who wrote the dissent in Cafeteria
Workers, used the following balancing test: ". . . 'consideration of what due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well
2
as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.' 2
19 410 F.2d at 1328. In reaching this conclusion the court read the principle of Cafeteria
Workers, in light of Pickering v. Bd. of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Contra, Pred v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d
851 (5th Cir. 1969).
20 410 F.2d at 1329. The court quoted the following passage from Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. Rmv. 1045 (1968):

Because of the special needs of the university . . . great discretion must be given it
in decisions about the renewal of contracts during the probationary period. In deciding whether to rehire or grant tenure, the considerations involved go well beyond a
judgment about general teaching competence. Id. at 1101.
21 410 F.2d at 1329. The court quoted from Ward v. Bd. of Regents, 138 F. 372 (8th
Cir. 1905). The sentiment is also expressed in Schultz v. Palmberg, 317 F. Supp. 659, 662
(D. Wyo. 1970): "The discretion of a school board in this respect should be broad and as
long as such discretion is exercised in good faith and is not patently arbitrary or unreasonable,
this Court will not interfere to aid those whom the Board does not choose to employ."
22 Taken as a whole Cafeteria Workers is neither a good nor an easily understood tool.
Mr. Justice Stewart seems to want the best of both worlds: "We may assume that Rachel
Brawner could not constitutionally have been excluded . . . if the announced grounds . . .
It does not follow, however, that she was entitled to a hearhad been patently arbitrary ....
ing when the reason advanced for her exclusion was. .. entirely rational . . . ." This reasoning
appears sound until one realizes that the reason advanced was that she lost her clearance, but
there was no reason given why she lost her clearance.
23 36 NoTRE DAME I AWYER 576, 580 (1961); 36 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 506, 513 (1961).
24 Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L.
REv. 40, 73 (1961).
25 Justice Stewart's opinion leaves room to make broad subjective evaluations of the harm
suffered. For example, Justice Stewart said: "There is nothing to indicate that this determination would in any way impair Rachel Brawner's employment opportunities anywhere else...."
As pointed out by commentators, "the only other job offered by her employer, which she could
not accept, was in an inconvenient out-of-town location . . . ." Bickel, The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HI-xv. L. Rav. 40, 73 (1961). In the Court's

view the injury was de minimis; in another's eyes it was substantial.
26 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
27 Id. at 263. There has also been use of the clear statement that due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853,
861 (2d Cir. 1970).
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This balancing test or formula for weighing the governmental interest against the
individual interest has as a necessary element the implicit recognition that where
fundamental rights are in jeopardy the scale will not always be tipped in favor
of the individual. As Justice Brennan noted in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Robel, "It is true .. .that Congress often regulates indiscriminately,
through preventive or prophylactic measures, ...and that such regulation has
been upheld even where fundamental freedoms are potentially affected ....,2s
The competing interests of the state and the individual must be balanced and
fully developed before the court can determine whether minimum procedural
requirements are appropriate. The courts, in dealing with the procedural due
process required by the fourteenth amendment, have not questioned the reasonableness of the classifications of tenured and nontenured teachers."9 However, in
cases where individuals have properly alleged violations'of a constitutionally
protected right or privilege, there has been extensive examination of the reasons
for nonretenion.3 0 If the courts find under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment that all nontenured teachers must be given the panoply
of procedural safeguards proposed (such as those given in Roth), then the classifications as they now exist will be 3destroyed and the states effectively prohibited
from utilization of tenure systems.

One of the purposes of tenure statutes in general was outlined in Ehret v.
Kulpmont School District:
[T]o maintain an adequate and competent teaching staff, free from political
and personal arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers
might feel secure and more efficiently perform their duty of instruction, but
it was not the intention of the legislature to confer any special privileges or
immunities upon professional employees to retain permanently their position .... 32

It is clear that tenure is intended to secure certain benefits to the individual
for his well-being and the well-being of the school system. Moreover, legislatures
28 389 U.S. 258, 270 (1967). For a discussion of the recently defined "compelling interest
test," see 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 142 (1969).'
29 Even Judge Doyle noted in Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 979 (W.D. Wis.
1970): "This standard is intended to be considerably less severe than the standard of 'cause'
as the latter has been applied to professors with tenure . . . ." This recognizes the classification and seemingly places the stamp of approval on the classification per se. It soon became
apparent, however, that the standard for judging the board's action would not be as lax as
might be gathered. In the companion case, Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F. Supp.
984, 992 (W.D. Wis. 1970), it was held that there was a genuine issue as to whether the
plaintiffs had been "given a reasonably complete statement of the basis of decision . . ."
which might cause the plaintiffs to limit their "response to one factor or a few factors,
following which the Board proceeded to base its decision on a wider range of factors." Courts
have questioned the reasonableness of a particular rule relating to tenure. In Richardson v.
Bd. of Education, 6 Cal. 2d 583, 58 P.2d 1285 (1936) the Supreme Court of California
affirmed a district board's action in fixing the minimum number of days attendance necessary
to qualify for one-year probationary status. See generally 3 HAMiLTON, SCisOOL LAW, 4118
(rev. ed. 1965-1966).
30 Hanover Tp. Fed. of Teach. v. Hanover Commun. Sch. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 757 (N.D.
Ind. 1970).
31 Thaw v. Bd. of Public Instruction, 432 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1970). The court said:
"the requirement . . . would nullify the probationary system, whose purpose is to provide
the school board a short-term test period during which the fledgling teacher may be examined,
evaluated, and, if found wanting for any constitutional reason, not rehired."
32 333 Pa. 518, 524, 5 A.2d 188, 191 (1939).
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provided a probationary period to insure that security afforded by tenure will
not unduly inhibit administrators in selecting teachers on the basis of merit.
It [the Act] established merit as the essential basis for the right of permanent
employment . . .. [I]t is equally clear that . .. [it] does not impair discre-

tionary power of school authorities to make the best selections consonant
with the public good ....33
How would requiring a public institution to give a nontenured teacher prior,
specific statements of the reasons for nonretention and a hearing thereon affect
the tenure system? One significant result might be that administrators would
confuse the prerequisites of "cause" with the statement of reasons and hesitate
to enter an adverse decision that would culminate in a formal grievance or court
action. Moreover, "[d]isclosure would undoubtedly have a chilling effect on unfettered discussion among the responsible persons." 4 While some individuals or
associations might be willing to risk the erosion of distinctions, it is the courts'
obligation to determine what the erosion would mean to the system of classification desired by the legislature and the great bulk of the profession alike.
An example of procedures now used in dismissals for cause can be found in
the American Association of University Professors' [AAUP] Statement on Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal 'Proceedings, 1958 and the Academic
Freedom and Tenure: 1940 Statement of Principles and Interpretive Comments s Read together, these documents reveal that the tenured professor has a
right to: (1) notice of dismissal, including a statement with "reasonable particularity" of the ground for the dismissal; (2) a hearing; (3) assistance of counsel;
(4) an opportunity to speak in hig own behalf; (5) confrontation of witnesses;
(6) an opportunity to question witnesses who testify orally; and (7) a stenographic record of the proceedings. The Roth case and its companion case Gouge
hold that the nontenured professor has a right to: (1) notice of nonretention,
with a "reasonably complete" statement of the basis of nonretention; (2) a hearing; and (3) an opportunity to speak in his own behalf. The only hard distinctions that now exist between the AAUP tenured ideal and nontenured reality as
posited by Roth are: (1) assistance of counsel; (2) right to confront witnesses;
33 McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 202 Minn. 102, 108, 277 N.W. 541, 544 (1938). Brief
for Bd. of Governors of State Colleges and Universities of Illinois, the Bd. of Regents of
Regency Universities of Illinois, the Bd. of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, the American Ass'n of State Colleges and Universities, the American Council on Education and the
Ass'n of American Colleges as'Amici Curiae at 8-9, Roth v. Bd. of Regents, 310 F. Supp.
1970) [hereinafter
972 (W.D. Wi. 1970), appeal docketed, No. 18490'(7th Cir., filedreferred to as Brief for Bd. of Governors]. There are other significant benefits that accrue
to the institution as a result of the tenure system. These benefits may be extremely important
under the stresses on modern university communities.
The tenured faculty . . .bring experience and wisdom. They are leaders in their
disciplines. For the most part they have a more mature sense of the long-term
values of the university, its purposes and potential .... [I]heir role is to temper
the enthusiasms of youth and the insensitivities of administrators. They have a longterm interest in the institution and must live with the consequences of today's action,
in, contrast to the nontenured faculty and the students, who are for the most part
transient ....
Miller, Tenure: Bulwark of Academic Freedom and Brake on Change, 51 ED. Rac. 241, 243
(1970).

34
35

Brief for Bd.of Governors at 9.
44 AAUP BULL. 272-74 (1958); 56 AAUP BULL. 323-26 (1970).
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and (3) right to a stenographic record. " It takes little imagination to see that
the erosion of the distinctions has neared the point of collapse of classifications.
Benjamin Solomon and Dr. Ida Lalor have discovered that the Illinois
Supreme Court is unwilling to risk erosion of the tenure system. In an opinion by
Mr. Justice Kluczynski delivered on January 25, 1971, the court adopted the
approach of Jones v. Hopper. While affirming the summary judgment of the
circuit court on procedural grounds, the Illinois Supreme Court felt compelled
to add:
[I]f the issue were before the court we would be inclined to find that a
Board has a right, summarily, to terminate a probationary teacher's employment at the end of his employment term, and that he has no constitutional
right to continued employment. 37
The court continued:
In a recent Federal case, Jones v. Hopper... in which certiorariwas denied
by the United States Supreme Court on March 23, 1970, the court considered a complaint by a probationary teacher who contended that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not retained because he had
sought to exercise his constitutional rights of speech, publication and religion.
The court held that the complaint did not state a cause of action, that the
college had a right not to renew his contract, and that a probationary
teacher's expectancy of continued employment, after expiration of the term
for which he was employed, did not constitute a right, privilege or immunity
secured to him by the constitution or by the law, and was not an interest
protected under the Civil Rights Act. We agree, and find that if a probationary teacher has no constitutional right to continued employment under
such circumstances, the Board would have no duty to provide him with
specific reasons for his nonretention.38
It would be tempting to claim that the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court
represents nothing more than a nonthinking acceptance of Jones, or that the
opinion of the court adds no original thought or imaginative legal interpretation.
Yet the significance of the comments made by the court represent much more than
mere stare decisis. The fact that the court wrote their opinion after considering
both the liberal approach of Roth and the stolid conservative view of Jones,
makes it evident that a conscious choice was made to draw a line and stand with
the governing boards of state-supported institutions rather than individual probationary teachers supported by their unions. Distrust between publicly employed
teachers and their governing boards seems to be most acute when probationary
teachers are involved. This may be due to the fact that boards have traditionally
had nearly unlimited control over the immediate destiny of the nontenured
36

37
38

In Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 1970) the court held that:
if a teacher determines to assert that such non-renewal is really a form of punishment for his exercise of constitutional rights or otherwise constitutes some actionable
wrong, the teacher should notify the institution . . . . Upon the receipt . . . the
institution should constitute a tribunal to conduct ... a hearing ....
This hearing must include the right to produce witnesses and evidence and the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses ....
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
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teacher. Summary dismissal, it could be argued, will always stimulate resentment
and a fear of the unknown. Increased communication between governing boards
and probationary teachers who are not going to be retained might have the
twofold effect of forcing the board to insure that there is a rational basis for their
action and smoothing the troubled minds of nontenured employees. The Illinois
Supreme Court has cast its lot with the governing boards. Its decision represents
an act of faith in the board and leaves the formulation of constructive policies to
the board's judgment.
It is interesting to note that the Illinois Supreme Court was undoubtedly
aware that Roth was on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. By taking a stand in opposition to Roth the Illinois Supreme
Court may be setting the stage for a federal-state confrontation.
Probationary teachers and their supporters will continue to argue that:
"The issue, properly stated, is not whether the plaintiff had an unqualified right
to an 'expectation . . .' but, rather, whether he had a right to exercise his first
amendment rights free from retaliatory state action in the form of its control over
public employment . . ."'
Nevertheless, the opinion of the Illinois Supreme
Court and the preponderance of federal cases indicate that however the issue is
framed, a nontenured teacher who seeks disclosure in the face of a reluctant
board will be forced into the courts to gain vindication.40 It goes without saying
that the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Roth will be closely watched by all
parties involved in these increasingly frequent controversies.
Mark T. Dunn

CRIMINAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TiE F.B.I.'s RIGHT TO RETAIN
AND DISSEMINATE ARREST RECORDS OF PERSONS NOT CONVICTED OF A CRIME
MAY BE LIMITED BY THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS.-On August 10,

1965, Dale Menard, a nineteen-year-old college student, was taken into custody
by the Los Angeles police on suspicion of burglary. After being incarcerated for
two days, Menard was allowed to go free since there existed no evidence with
which to connect him to the crime. Pursuant to California law,' the police
forwarded a record of Menard's arrest, along with a copy of his fingerprints, to
the F.B.I.' This record, including information regarding the disposition of the
case, is presently on file with the F.B.I.
39 42 COLUm. L. REv. 129, 131 (1970).
40 Professors Solomon and Lalor have filed a petition for rehearing with the Illinois
Supreme Court.

1
2

CALIF. PENAL CODE § 1115 (West 1970).
Menard's file contained a card with the following information:
Date Arrested or Received-8-10-65
Charge of Offense-459PC Burglary
Disposition or Sentence-8-12-65
Released - Unable to connect with any felony or misdemeanor at this time
Occupation-Student
Residence of Person Fingerprinted-Saticoy and Canoga Canoga Park.
After the initiation of this suit, one amendment was added to the record:
Disposition or Sentence-8-12-65-Released-Unable to connect with any felony or
misdemeanor-in accordance with 849b ()-not deemed an arrest but detention only.
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Menard instituted an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to have his record purged from the files of the F.B.I. The fundamental
thrust of his argument was based upon an interpretation of §849b(1) of the
California Penal Code.3 Under this section, a person who is taken into custody
and subsequently released without charges having been lodged against him is
deemed to only have been detained rather than arrested. Menard attempted to
prove that his detainment could not be utilized in formulating a criminal record.4
The district court rejected Menard's contention; on appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held: there were insufficient facts to rule that the
power of the F.B.I. to retain and disseminate arrest records of a person not
convicted of a crime may be limited by the individual's rights guaranteed by the
first and fifth amendments. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
In denying the appellant's motion for summary judgment, the court cursorily
glazed over the appellant's contention. Although in his opinion, Chief Judge
Bazelon did not explicitly express the basis for this cursory treatment, he did
indicate two reasons for the court's action. First, the federal court was not certain
that the California courts would classify, for the purpose of compiling records,
"detainment" as something different from an arrest with a subsequent release.5
Second, they were somewhat uncertain that the state law would be binding upon
the federal agency even if the appellant's interpretation was correct.6
After the court disposed of the appellant's reasoning for summary judgment,
they turned to the disposition of the appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment. In responding to the appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment, which
had been granted in the court below, the court was forced to address itself to
the difficult problem of reconciling the rights of society as a whole with the rights
of the individual. The government strongly contended that if the detainment
were classified as an arrest, then the problem would be readily solved since the
federal police agency has been granted the power to retain criminal records.7
The court, however, felt that this point was not quite that easily resolved.' The
ultimate solution is interwoven with intricacies and complications that promise
to give resounding implications to society as well as the individual.
In light of these facts, Chief Judge Bazelon, speaking for the court, said:
The very seriousness of the problem underscores the necessity for a clear
The short of
and complete factual record as a basis for adjudication ....
the matter is that the facts established on cross motions for summary judgment were simply inadequate for proper resolution of the complex questions
presented. 9 (Footnotes omitted.)
3 Any peace officer may release from custody, instead of taking such person before a
magistrate, any person arrested without warrant whenever:
1. He is satisfied that there is no ground for making a criminal complaint against the
person arrested. Any record of such arrest shall include a record of the release
hereunder and thereafter shall not be deemed an arrest but a detention only. CALIF.
PENAL CODE § 849b(l) (West 1970).
4 Brief for Appellant at 8-10, Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
5 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
6 Id. at 490.
7 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
8 430 F.2d at 490.
9 Id. at 494-95.
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The "complex questions" involved' the almost insurmountable task of establishing the pinpoint balance at which the rights of society and the rights of the
individual are in harmony. Although it is true that the individual must to some
degree subordinate his own interest to thos&e of society, there must be drawn, as
the court indicated, a line where this ceases to be."0 In evaluating exactly where
the line is to be drawn, many important factors must be taken into consideration.
Actually, the power of the F.B.I. to retain and disseminate (to some degree)
arrest records is just a natural outgrowth of society's right to'protect itself from
the criminal actions of individuals and organizations. In 1930, Congress explicitly
empowered the F.B.I. to "acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification,
criminal identification, crime, and other records."" Although- there have been
subsequent changes in the text, the main import of the enactment remains fundamentally the same.' 2 The primary reason for dispute and the most abundant
source of litigation has been the breadth of this power which society has granted
to police organizations.
Of those cases which have considered this problem, most have been concerned with state laws and state agencies. 3 In the early part of the century, it was
generally accepted that the decision to release or to retain arrest xecords was
within the realm of police discretion. Case law has upheld the lroposition that
the police, in protecting society, should be granted broad authority to choose
those implements including arrest records which will enable them to most efficiently and effectively discharge this duty.' 4 The aforementioned premise was
held valid whether the legislature had made a specific grant of such power or
not.' The retention by police of an individual's arrest record was considered
"a humiliation to which he must submit for the benefit of society."' For the most
10 Id. at 492.
11 5 U.S.C. § 340 (1930), repealed, Pub. L. No. 89-554 §,8(a), 80 Stat. 632, 648 (1966).
Present authority is based on 28 U.S.C. § 534(a) (1) (Supp. V, 1970).
12 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
13 These cases can be noted more for their consistency than their legal reasoning. The basic
premise that emerged was that the individual must suffer some hardship for the sake of society
as. a whole. This concept was based upon a balancing of public policy rather than legal
theorizing. Since the individual's -right of privacy was still in the embryonic stage and the
dispersement of arrest records was unlikely due to the immobility of society, the courts perceived no great difficulty in placing 'this added burden upon the individual. In recent years
society has changed vastly and these propositions do not necessarily hold true. Since the resolution of these cases was based upon policy judgments rather 'than legal concepts, this comment
does not attempt to devolve an in-depth historical development of these cases. Rather, the
general policy propositions for which they stand are set out.
14 Mabry v. Kettering, 89 Ark. 551, 117 S.W. 746 (1909); Shaffer v. United States, 24
App. D.C. 417 (1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 639 (1905); State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmeier,
154 Ind. 599, 57 N.E. 541 (1900); State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d
755 (1946), 225 Ind. 360, 74 N.E.2d 914 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834, reh.
denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1948); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909); Miller v.
Gllrespie, 196 Mich. 423, 163 N.W. 22 (1917) ; State ex rel. Reed v. Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153
S.W.2d 834 (1941); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N.J.Eq. 141, 152 A. 17 (1930), affd., 109
N.J.Eq. 241, 156 A. 658 (1931); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J.Eq. 341, 54 A.2d 469
(1947); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944); Roesch v. Ferber, 48 N.J.
Super. 231, 137 A.2d 61 "(1957); Molineux v. Collins, 177 N.Y. 395, 69 N.E. 727 (1904);
People ex rel. Joyce v. York, 27 Misc. 658, 59 N.Y. Supp. 418 (1899); Hansson v. Harris,
252 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Hodgman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122
(1915).
Two more recent decisions are: Herschel v. Dyra, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966); Sterling
v. City of Oakland, 208 Cal. App.2d 1, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1962).
15 Id.
16 Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 10, 39 A.2d 851 (1944).
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part, the individual could only hope for comfort when a Rogues' Gallery was
involved. Here, most cases held that the display of an innocent person's photograph in a Rogues' Gallery was a public affront to him and that this was an
overextension by society and its legally sanctioned protector-the police." Apart
from those Rogues' Gallery public display cases, the courts generally held that
otherwise, the individual was injured only minimally, if at all, by the retention
of his record.'"
Many of the foundations for granting such broad power to the police were
and are still very viable. Allowing the police broad discretion enables the personnel trained in this field to best utilize facilities for combating crime. 9 Even
though the retention of some criminal records is indispensable to protecting society
from the criminal element, one must decide at what point and under what circumstances the rights of the few must be sacrificed for those of the many.
There are other reasons which militate against the purging of these records.
In many instances, the files remain incomplete as to the disposition of a particular
case, and such a record may become vital if the person disappears or becomes a
fugitive from justice."0 Following the same theory, many cases have never been
resolved and the suspects on record with the F.B.I. have never been exonerated. 1
Finally, with the expansion of organized crime, arrest records may be a vital
force in helping to curb this growth.2 Oftentimes an individual whose arrest
record is extensive and who is without any subsequent convictions goes free
because of the aid of shrewd lawyers or other forms of coercion such as blackmail
or bribery. This appalling reality can be seen most vividly in the case of the
leaders of organized crime. It was aptly expressed in Fernicolav. Keenan:
In every large community are men who have never been convicted of
an indictable offense, but whose associations and manner of life are such that
the police feel reasonably assured that such a one,
unless he turn over a new
23
leaf, will eventually be guilty of a serious crime.
With the increased mobility of society and the tremendous upsurge of
criminal activity, police organizations such as the F.B.I. should be given the
necessary tools to keep abreast of the situation. Possibly the retention of all arrest
records is one of these tools, but the need for them must be weighed against the
damage which they will inflict upon the innocent victims. It is, precisely, an
earnest present-day concern for properly balancing the individual's rights against
17 State ex tel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), 225 Ind. 360, 74
N.E.2d 914 (1947), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 834, reh. denied, 333 U.S. 858 (1948);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906); Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704,
42 So. 227 (1906); Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653 (1909); State ex rel. Reed v.
Harris, 348 Mo. 426, 153 S.W.2d 834 (1941); McGovern v. Van Riper, 140 N.J.Eq. 341, 54
A.2d 469 (1947); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (1944).
18 See note 14 supra.
19 Hoover, Law Enforcement States Its View, 12 VILL. L. REv. 457 (1967).
20 W. LAFAvE, ARREST 303-16 (1965); J. SKOLNIK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 73-90
(1966).
21 Id.

22 H. OVERSTREET & B. OVERSTREET, THE F.B.I. IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 347-74 (1969)
[hereinafter referred to as OVERSTREET].
23 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 10, 39 A.2d 851 (1944).
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society's needs which makes it imperative'that added safeguards be installed where
needed to protect the rights of the individual.
In a society characterized by vast networks of telecommunications and advanced transportation, the individual has less and less room in which to seek selfsolitude. Privacy has become almost as sacred as it was in Orwell's 1984. Legal
authorities have realized that it is a value that should be increasingly protected.
Charles Reich observed:
But today more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status
rather than of tangible goods. An individual's profession or occupation is a

prime example ....

24

The most obvious penalty is simply a denial or deprivation of some
form of wealth or privilege .... 25
He continues and postulates that this emerging attack upon privacy is a "new and
unusual punishment. ' 2 6 Other authors have expressed the same or similar sentiments that "personal freedom is perhaps more imperiled than at any time in our
history. ' '2T Little insight is necessary to correlate the loss of individual privacy
with the retention and dissemination of arrest records. This is not a moot question
but one that looms large in the realm of harsh reality. Its implications are resounding.
At an earlier time in our history the retention and possible dissemination
of an arrest record would be of slight detriment to the individual. This was
principally attributable to the rather immobile state of society at the time. However, in today's highly mobile society, the retention by police of an innocent
individual's arrest record creates a stigma which can directly bear on the functions
which that person can perform.
These far-reaching stigmas which individuals must bear are inflicted upon
a substantial portion of our society each year. Although accurate tabulations have
not been kept, there exists sufficient information to calculate that the number is
alarmingly high. In 1962, 750,000 adults were arrested in California; of this
group 180,000 had action taken against them. This means that for a period
covering a single year in a single state, there were 570,000 innocent people bearing the burden of possessing an arrest record.28 This is not an isolated example;
it seems to manifest the trend in most areas of the country. In New York, a recent
study showed that 45 % of the people arrested for felonies were released without
charges having been filed.2 9 Owing to the present system, a sizable segment of
society will have to compete with one strike already against it since to much of the
outside world an arrest record is tantamount to a conviction.
24

Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 738 (1964).

25

Id. at 755.

26
27

Id.
Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights-

Professions, Occupations and

Labor Law, 11 S. Louis L.J. 382, 386 (1967).
28 Comment, Guilt by Record, 1 CAL.W. L. REv. 126, 126 n.1 (1965).
29 GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 23 (1966).
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These records can haunt an individual for the rest of his life. In seeking
employment, he is at a tremendous disadvantage. A recent survey has shown that
75% of the employment agencies in New York refused to recommend an individual with an arrest record regardless of whether it was followed by a conviction or not."0 If a person is required to disclose that he has an arrest record
to a prospective employer, he has two alternatives open to him. First he can
explain the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate event and hope that the
employer will be sympathetic to his plight. With the expanded pool of possible
employees from which to choose, it is highly unlikely that the employer would be
willing to expend the funds necessary to verify the authenticity of the prospective
employee's story. 3' The second option is also of dubious consolation. He can
deny the existence of his arrest record and hope that the employer does not
receive a copy of his file.
The area of employment is not the only instance in which the specter of a
past record will pervade his later life. Other endeavors in which a previously arrested person might venture may equally be thwarted. For many licensing boards
and agencies, an absence of an arrest record is one of the criteria employed in
evaluating whether or not a candidate is qualified to receive a license. 2 It is said
that even a mountain guide in the West must now be a man of "good moral character.""3 Likewise in many of the professional fields, the board of examiners will
frequently consider an arrest record in deciding whether a person should be
allowed to practice his chosen profession." Educational opportunities may be
withheld from a record holder for the very same reason." Law enforcement
personnel and the courts frequently take the past record into consideration if the
individual has a later encounter with the law.36 The problem is dangerously
intensified if the person not only has to admit that he has a record, but if the
employer, agency, etc., receives a copy of the file itself.
If the files are dispersed outside police circles, which it seems they are,
the individual has to function under a considerably increased burden. The President's Crime Commission Report found that 351% of all records were incomplete
and deficient in regard to the final disposition of the case.3 7 With the final disposition lacking, a file would be totally misleading. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of
the F.B.I., has candidly admitted: "In the hands of an inexperienced person
who is unfamiliar with its purpose, an F.B.I. report can be a dangerous instrument of injustice."" *Hoover continues to comment, "It must also be understood
that the overwhelming majority of F.B.I. reports do not tell a complete story."3 9
30 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 75 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Report].

31 See note 28 supra, at 127 n.4.
Occupations and
32 Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights -Professions,
Labor Law, 11 ST. Louis L.J. 382, 399-410 (1967).
33 WYo. STAT. ANNOT. § 23-55 (1957).
34
State ex rel. McAvoy v. La. St. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 238 La. 502, 115 So. 2d
833 (1959).
35 Due v. Florida A. & M., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
36 W. LAFAVE, ARREST 141-42 (1965); Suggs v. United States, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 337,
340, 407 F.2d 1272, 1275 (1969); Russell v. United States, 131 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 45, 402
F.2d 185, 186 (1968).
37

Report at 268.

38
39

Hoover, The ConfidentialNature of F.B.I. Reports, 8 SYACUSE L. Rv. 1, 5 (1956).
Id. at 4.
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This fact is especially important in light of the F.B.I.'s failure to evaluate or make
clarifying recommendations on these files; they merely distribute them." Once a
file leaves the F.B.I.1 office, the agency in a practical sense loses all physical control
4

over the material.

The likelihood that this information will fall upon the untrained ear of the
outside world is fairly substantial. Although the act of Congress which granted
the F.B.I. this power has a restraining clause allowing for cancellation in the: case
of dissemination outside police circles, the restraining clause has only, been paid
lip service. 2 Attorney General John Mitchell believes that the information can
also be dispersed to most banks, insurance companies, and railroad police.'
Realistically, the material could even be distributed to newspapers if the party
were subsequently charged with a serious crime.44
The results of various research studies on the dissemination of arrest information overwhelmingly show a rampant trend of dispersement throughout society.
Estimates place the F.B.I. distribution of arrest records at a minimum of 100,000
files per month to federal agencies alone.," A California employer recently commented that he could acquire the "rap sheet" on each applicant if he could afford
the price of having the data processed. 46 In New York several hundred employees
of a security firm lost their jobs because they had "criminal records." The security
agency received their information through a chain of distribution with the ultimate link being that of the files of the F.B.I. 9t These are but a few examples of
the widespread dissemination that these files receive.
Faced with the injustice that such a system thrusts upon an individual,
several courts have recently been more receptive to his plight. Observing recent
drastic redefinitions of individual rights, courts have surmised that possibly the
individual is disproportionately injured by the retention and threatened dissemination of arrest records. This new outlook was succinctly described by Chief
Judge Cancio in United States v. Kalish:
[W]hen an accused is acquitted of the crime or when he is discharged without conviction, no public good is accomplished by the retention of criminal
identification records. On the other hand, a great imposition is placed upon
the citizen. His privacy and personal dignity is [sic) invaded as long as the
Justice Department retains criminal identification records, criminal arrest,
fingerprints and rogues' gallery photograph .

This preservation of records constitutes an unwarranted attack upon
48
his character and reputation and.., violates his dignity as a human being.
There have been numerous instances in recent years in-which courts have purged
40 OVERSTREET at 380-87.
41 Id.
42 Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 495 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

43

28 C.F.R. § 0.85(b) (1970)..

44 28 C.F.RL § 50.2(b) (3) (i) (1970); 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b) (4) (1970)
45 Hoover, supra note 38, at 15.
46 Comment, Guilt by Record, 1_CAL. W. L. Rrv. 126, 132 (1965).

47 New York Times, Feb. 5, 1970,.at 1, col. 2.
48

271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.C.P.R. 1967).
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the files of innocent people.49 In all cases, the underlying rationale used was that
the record would not serve to protect society and could have a definite detrimental
effect upon the innocent recipients. ° Presently these attacks have been limited
to a case-by-case method; but with strong constitutional arguments being offered,
the future retention of all arrest records is at least cloudy.
Chief Judge Bazelon expressed his doubts as to the constitutionality of the
existing situation in this way. "It is difficult to find constitutional justification for
its memorialization in the F.B.I.'s criminal files."'" The judge continued by
noting "there is a limit beyond which the government may not tread in devising
classifications that lump the innocent with the guilty." 2 This latter statement is
an extension of the same court's view in a non-criminal context presented in the
first amendment case of Boorda v. Subversive Activity Control Board.5" "Therefore, in weighing the public interest in disclosure, we must weigh a different
quantity: since innocent members may easily be separated from guilty ones, the
public interest in exposure of the guilty cannot be used to justify exposure of the
innocent."'"
Following a similar vein, the argument is advanced that this retention and
dissemination violates the due process requirement of the fifth amendment. With
the tremendously adverse effect which this record may have upon the individual,
a modem postulation asserted is that the government is invading his right to life
and liberty without the due process guaranteed by the fifth amendment. 5
Although this argument has appeal, it has yet to be effective as a constitutional
challenge.
The right of privacy embodied in the first amendment has received the most
serious consideration. Privacy has been described as "the right to be let alone"
the "most comprehensive of rights," the one "most valued by civilized man."5
At least one court has decided that society is inflicting a gross injustice upon a
right guaranteed by the Constitution by forcing certain individuals to face public
disclosure of records that are not of a "public" nature. The District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina struck down a North Carolina law allowing retention of the arrest records of innocent people as being violative of their
rights guaranteed by the first amendment. The case has been appealed to the
Supreme Court upon these grounds, but the Court has yet to take any action of
a definite nature upon it. 8
It is quite possible that the nexus of the conflict does not necessarily have to
be positioned on the side of one extreme or the other. In Menard the Court indicated that it might be possible to establish a point of equilibrium without
destroying one interest or the other. This suggestion would be accomplished by
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allowing retention while strictly limiting dissemination. Chief Judge Bazelon, in
his opinion, frequently spoke of the use to which the records might be put. At
one point, he observed: "if the person arrested has been exonerated it is difficult
to see why he should be subject to continuing punishment by adverse use of his
'criminal record.' ,5 In a later footnote comment, he continued: "Similarly,
those responsible for maintaining a system of information must bear the responinaccurate or misleading information
sibility in the first instance for assuring that
6
detriment."
individual's
an
to
used
not
is
These passages must be read in light of another excerpt in whIch he noted:
Obviously, those respofisible for investigating and prosecuting criminal
activity should have the primary responsibility for determining what information will be most -helpful in carrying out their task; and so long as
they do not infringe on the rights of the individuals, the court may not
interfere.15
It thus would appear that the judge is advocating a position in which the rights
of both sides may be protected.
This reasoning seems to be a sound solution to a prickly legal question. If the
plan becomes operative, it would protect both the rights of society as well as the
rights of the individual. Undoubtedly some people will argue that such a move
would handicap the police in fulfilling its role, 2 while others will deem this type
of action as insufficient protection for the individual.6 3 If a workable method of
allowing retention while limiting dissemination could be devised, it would
relegate these contentions to the sphere of the theoretical.
The court in promulgating this position was not offering a completely novel
idea. The act which empowers the F.B.I. to retain records has a cancellation
clause in the event of overzealous dissemination.1 4 The President's Crime Commission recommended a similar policy when it said:
There should be a national law enforcement directory that records an individual's arrest for serious crimes, the disposition of each case, and all
subsequent formal contacts with criminal justice agencies related to those
arrests. Access should be limited to criminal justice agencies 5 (.(Emphasis
added.)
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Finally, in a footnote which actually conceptualized the main thrust of the
decision, a'warning is issued. The court's comment indicated that if the present
procedure were not revised, then the records of innocent individuals would not be
allowed tobe-retained in files subject to dissemination." In the cases of the innocent, the court's anouncement would be the only feasible means of protecting
the individual.
Louis Nizer once noted that in cases involving the right of privacy,
... the. court is called upon to find the point where the rights of the individual (to be let alone) and the right of society (to know the truth and to
protect public safety) are in equilibrium; a succession of such points constitutes the line in which the privacy doctrine has progressed.6 7
In Menard the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has clearly indicated that the privacy doctrine has moved a few more cautious steps along the
line of protecting individual rights and, in doing so, has elevated the right of
privacy to the same pinnacle to which other individual rights have recently been
lofted.
Michael M. McGloin
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